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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the relationship between Afghanistan's Taliban regime and Islamic 
opposition movements in the neighboring Central Asian republics. Despite alarming 
rhetoric to the contrary from Central Asian political leaders, Taliban ideology is unlikely 
to spread beyond Afghanistan's borders. The Taliban are an idiosyncratic phenomenon 
whose anachronistic ideology and violent behavior are more attributable to an obscure 
tribal code and the sociological repercussions of warfare than to any conventional 
expression of Islam. Islamic culture in the Central Asian republics was somewhat 
secularized by 70 years of Soviet domination. The small but growing Islamic opposition 
is attributable not to the appeal of Taliban-style fundamentalism, but to distinctly 
domestic factors such as political oppression and economic stagnation. Central Asia's 
authoritarian regimes are essentially causing the Islamic insurgency they seek to 
suppress; the Taliban are only significant to the extent that Afghanistan's instability 
exacerbates ongoing economic and political problems throughout the region. These 
findings have significant policy implications for the United States and other interested 
powers, which must deal more urgently with Afghanistan's instability, and should 
augment military support to Central Asian governments with an equal or greater 
emphasis on political and economic reform. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Afghanistan's Taliban regime is commonly associated with a variety of 
destructive activities; including human rights abuses, international terrorism, narcotics 
distribution, and severe Islamic fundamentalism. Central Asian political leaders, along 
with policy circles in the United States and Russia, warn that Taliban-style ideology will 
infect the nascent Central Asian republics as they struggle to consolidate their 
independence and stability. Though militant Islamist groups are present in Central Asia, 
and the Taliban indeed provide some degree of support to these movements, it is unlikely 
that the Taliban's unusual creed would find a significant audience in the Central Asian 
republics. Despite rhetoric to the contrary from political leaders, Central Asian Islamists 
are not proteges of the Taliban and they do not represent an influx of Taliban ideology. 
Islamic discontent in Central Asia is a distinctly indigenous phenomenon caused by 
domestic political and economic conditions. The Taliban are only significant to the 
extent that their "rogue" behaviors exacerbate Central Asia's economic and political 
mismanagement. 
Though avowedly Islamic (and perceived as such by the West), the Taliban and 
their interpretations of religion and authority are extremely idiosyncratic, and have less to 
do with any commonly accepted Islamic doctrine than with secular factors such as 
anachronistic tribal custom, the sociological repercussions of prolonged warfare, and the 
consequences of life spent in refugee camps. The Taliban are at odds not only with 
conventional Islam in Afghanistan, but with Islamic understanding and practice 
throughout the Muslim world. It is therefore unlikely that Taliban ideology would spread 
to other Islamic societies—particularly Central Asia, where religion and politics are 
IX 
comparatively secular after 70 years of Soviet domination and indoctrination. Central 
Asia's current "Islamic renaissance" is essentially a reassertion of cultural identity rather 
than an expression of faith or ideology. Strains of political Islam have been present in 
Central Asia since well before the appearance of the Taliban, and are more consistent 
with conventional Islamist movements than with the Taliban. 
The roots of Central Asia's small but growing Islamic opposition, as well as the 
real impact of the Taliban, can be found in Central Asia's political and economic 
problems. The current Central Asian leaders, all of whom are former Soviet 
apparatchiks, inherited an inauspicious political economy from their Soviet forefathers. 
Since reluctantly acquiring independence in 1991, Central Asia's leaders have failed to 
reverse regressive Soviet trends. Politics remain staunchly authoritarian; if anything, 
political oppression has become more severe and autocracy is further consolidated. The 
Central Asian economies remain stagnant and state-dominated. The current governments 
are failing to meet popular welfare expectations or to compensate for these failures by 
granting more political rights and freedoms to the Central Asian people. Consequently, 
the most oppressed and economically disadvantaged sectors of the population have 
turned increasingly toward Islamic opposition in parts of Central Asia where religion is 
more deeply embedded. 
Development of the region's latent oil and gas reserves could alleviate economic 
frustration, but the Taliban's destabilizing behaviors in Afghanistan, along with 
overblown international competition for pipelines, have thwarted the construction of 
efficient export routes from Central Asia to lucrative markets in South and East Asia. 
Additionally, the Taliban's severe fundamentalism and chaotic rule heighten the anti- 
Islamic fears of Central Asia's secular dictators, which only reinforces their tendency to 
oppress internal dissent. The Taliban are therefore an important intervening variable in 
Central Asia's Islamist insurgency, but Central Asia's leaders bear the greatest causal 
responsibility for the problem. As in other parts of the Muslim world, the rise of political 
Islam in Central Asia is most attributable to political and economic frustration. 
These findings have important policy consequences for the United States and 
other interested powers, which must reassess and reconceptualize their objectives and 
policies in Afghanistan and Central Asia. International policy should work in concert 
toward peace and stability in the region. Its focus should be shifted away from costly, 
unproductive competition for energy pipelines and exclusive obsession with the Taliban's 
idiosyncratic fundamentalism. The United States in particular should put its Afghanistan 
policy into wider perspective. The peaceful resolution of Afghanistan's civil war should 
be pursued at least as urgently the extradition of Usama Bin Ladin. Central Asia's 
political leaders have played successfully on Western fears of Islamic fundamentalism in 
order to receive international support for their suppression of Islamic dissent. American 
analysts and policymakers tend to perceive the Central Asian governments as bastions of 
secular stability against a violent, "Talibanized" insurgency. They should instead 
understand that the current Central Asian regimes are, in many respects, brutal 
dictatorships that are causing their own insurgency problems through political oppression 
and economic mismanagement. The situation is not unlike that of pre-revolutionary Iran. 
The United States, Russia, and other outside powers should augment military support to 
the Central Asian republics with an equal or greater emphasis on political and economic 
reform. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since its dramatic emergence from Afghanistan's c?ivil war in 1994, the Taliban 
movement has brought relative order and stability to the Afghan provinces under its 
control. Most warring factions have been subdued, the population has been disarmed 
substantially, and roads have been made relatively safe for transit, trade, and smuggling. 
This basic security, however, has come at a great price for the Afghan people— 
particularly women—as the Taliban impose their violent and oppressive agenda on the 
war-torn and economically devastated nation. Shrouded in secrecy, the Taliban rarely 
issue press statements aside from occasional moral edicts or defiant but opaque responses 
to Western criticisms; they grant very few interviews—never to Western journalists; and 
they have never produced an official constitution, manifesto, or any codified body of 
governmental policy. Few people outside his family and inner political circle have seen 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar since his rise to prominence. Since coming to power, the 
Taliban have baffled, frustrated, and often horrified outside observers the world over. 
The Taliban's most notorious activities, including human rights abuses, support 
for international terrorism, and narcotics distribution, are well substantiated and 
publicized. Less clear, however, is the Taliban's impact on their Central Asian 
neighbors. Policy circles in Central Asia, Russia, and the United States fear that 
Afghanistan's volatility and draconian fundamentalism will infect the nascent Central 
Asian republics as they struggle to consolidate their independence and stability. Such an 
occurrence would have dire consequences, not only for the economic and political 
development of Central Asia, but also for international efforts to harvest the region's 
energy resources, contain the spread of Islamic political violence, and combat the 
trafficking of dangerous narcotics. Eager to connect to international markets and exploit 
their oil and natural gas reserves, Central Asian political leaders warn that Taliban-style 
fundamentalism is indeed on the rise in their respective nations, and threatens to 
"undermine the confidence of faithful Muslims in the reforming state, and to destroy the 
stability and national, civic, and interethnic harmony that are fundamental pre-conditions 
of transformations for the better." Militant Islamists "are aiming to discredit democracy, 
the secular state, and a multi-national and multi-confessional society."1 These concerns 
are echoed by world powers, including the United States, Russia, and China, all of which 
are targets themselves of Islamic political violence, and all of which seek to develop 
Central Asia's largely untapped energy resources. 
This thesis examines the relationship between the Taliban and Islamic opposition 
groups in the Central Asian republics, and evaluates the likelihood of Taliban-style 
fundamentalism taking root in Central Asia.2 Despite the alarming rhetoric from political 
actors and the evident connections between the Taliban and Central Asian Islamic 
militias, Taliban ideology is unlikely to replicate and advance in the Central Asian 
republics. Islamist opposition in Central Asia is, above all, an indigenous phenomenon 
arising in response to Central Asian political and economic conditions. The Taliban are 
Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1998), p. 26. 
The terms political Islam/Islamism, fundamentalism, and neofundamentalism will be used throughout this 
paper to describe Islamic opposition movements. Political Islam or Islamism designates modern protest 
movements that employ Islam as a political ideology to effect social change. Familiar examples are 
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian Hamas, or Pakistan's Jamaat-i Islami. The ttvmfundamentalism 
is used to describe movements that interpret religious scripture literally and advocate strict observance of 
religious practices. Fringe Protestant sects in the American south are the original examples of 
fundamentalism; in the Islamic world, the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia might be considered fundamentalists. 
Neofundamentalism is borrowed from Olivier Roy, who uses the term to describe post-modem Islamic 
fundamentalism that has devolved from political Islam. The use of political violence or "terrorism" to 
achieve objectives is not intrinsic to any of these movements, nor is it exclusive to one type or the other. 
only significant to the extent that their destabilizing behavior exacerbates Central Asia's 
failing economy and oppressive political climate. 
A. THEORY, METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
Two common assumptions about Islamic discontent provide a theoretical 
backdrop for this study. The first is Olivier Roy's view that political Islam has failed to 
provide viable alternatives to Western democracy and capitalism. Intellectually, Islamists 
have failed to reconcile an inescapable paradox: there cannot be an Islamic state without 
virtuous Muslims, but an Islamic state is required to create a society of virtuous Muslims. 
In practice, this problem results in the disassociation of Islamist thought from political 
institutions, the consequence of which is an "Islamist" state that lapses into conventional 
models of government (usually authoritarian) and economy (state socialism or liberal 
neoconservatism) while focusing all its energy on the imposition of social morality. 
Historically, Islamist models in countries such as Iran, Sudan, and to some extent, 
Algeria, have demonstrated these failures empirically. Islamic governments have neither 
invented new societies nor transcended the political boundaries of nation-states. 
Conventional political and economic systems, along with the logic of modern states, have 
trumped pan-Islamism. What remains in the wake of political Islam's failure is a 
"neofundamentalist" mentality preoccupied solely with moral behavior and the 
corrupting influence of the West. "Islamism is above all a sociocultural movement 
embodying the protest and frustration of a generation of youth that has not been 
integrated socially or politically."3 This frustration is the subject of the second theoretical 
premise, which examines the origins and attributes of Islamist discontent. 
Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994). 
The phenomenon of politicized Islam has been studied and explained from a 
range  of methodological  perspectives,  including  culture,  sociology,  and  political 
economy.      A general consensus has emerged among scholars that Islamists are 
motivated more by economic and political frustration than by theology. As Fouad Ajami 
explains: 
We have looked to the heavens, and we have looked in the scripture, for 
explanations for the appeal of political Islam. We have spent a generation 
speaking of "Islamic fundamentalism," of that theocratic force that has 
come into Arab life. But the truth lies in material circumstances. 
Theocratic politics blew in when economic growth faltered.5 
With the notable exception of Iran's 1979 Islamic Revolution, Islamist 
movements have not been led by the Muslim clergy.6 Islamists are typically middle 
class, educated (often with highly technical degrees), recently urbanized, and 
unemployed (or employed beneath their social and economic expectations). 
Consequently, Islamists are disappointed and frustrated. Islam is simply the ideological 
venue—the rallying cry—for expression of this economic and political frustration. 
Taken together, these theories suggest important questions about the Taliban and 
political Islam in Central Asia. What factors account for the Taliban's violent and 
regressive behavior? Are the Taliban constructing a new Islamic society in Afghanistan, 
or, like Iran and other Islamic states, are they regressing toward familiar authoritarian 
politics and state-centered economics?   Are they capable of exporting their ideology 
4
 See, for example, Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (New York: 
Routledge, 1991); Guilan Denoeux, Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal 
Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993); and Roy, The Failure of Political 
Islam. 
Fouad Ajami, "The Arab Inheritance," Foreign Affairs 76:5 (September/October 1997), p. 139. 
Even in Iran, the clergy played a smaller role than one might assume. The mullahs that did participate, 
including the Ayatollah Khomeini, were essentially "outcast" radicals whose ideology was not accepted by 
the mainstream Iranian clergy. 
beyond Afghanistan's borders? What is the economic and political status of Muslims in 
Central Asia? Do Central Asian opposition groups fit the commonly accepted 
socioeconomic profile of Islamists? Do the Taliban and Central Asian Muslims alter our 
understanding of political Islam and its root causes? 
In addition to these broad theoretical questions, this study addresses practical 
issues with policy implications both for Central Asian leaders and international powers. 
Is the Taliban regime spawning fundamentalist proteges in the newly independent Central 
Asian republics of the former Soviet Union? As Central Asian Muslims rediscover their 
Islamic heritage after 70 years of Soviet domination, will they perceive the Taliban as a 
model for Islamic government and social order? Does Taliban-style fundamentalism 
constitute a threat to stable, secular government in the region? How do the Taliban and 
Central Asian Islamists affect Central Asia's political and economic development? How 
should Central Asian governments and interested world powers react to Central Asia's 
Islamic renaissance? 
Two methodological perspectives guide the pursuit of these questions. Chapters 
II and III employ a sociological approach; social origins, norms, and structures are 
examined in order to establish a sort of "baseline" for cultural and ideological 
compatibility between the Taliban and Central Asian Muslims. Given the distinctly 
economic and political nature of Islamic discontent, Chapter IV considers the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism in the context of Central Asia's political economy. 
Specifically, Chapter II examines the social origins of the Taliban movement. It 
demonstrates the disparity between Taliban ideology on the one hand, and conventional 
Afghan notions of Islam and political authority on the other. The Taliban are revealed to 
be an anomalous phenomenon, influenced more by obscure tribal code and the alienating 
effects of warfare than by any conventional expression of traditional or political Islam. 
Chapter III contrasts the Taliban's history and ideology with that of Central Asian Islam. 
It examines the impact of Soviet dominion over the region and its culture. The 
experiences of Soviet secularism and totalitarian government have imbued most Central 
Asians with a worldview that is predominantly secular and, therefore, seemingly 
unconducive to Taliban-style fundamentalism. Violent opposition groups associated with 
the Taliban are present, but these groups currently command a very small following. A 
sociological comparison thus casts doubt on the proposition of a causal relationship 
between the Taliban and Central Asian fundamentalism. It also suggests that Central 
Asians, on the whole, are not culturally predisposed to Islamist ideology. 
Nonetheless, Islamic political violence in Central Asia has increased over the past 
decade, and evidence does indicate some sort of Taliban connection. If Taliban ideology 
has not infiltrated Central Asian political discourse, and if militant Central Asian 
opposition groups did not originate in Taliban training camps, then two questions remain: 
what factors account for the small but growing Islamic opposition in Central Asia, and 
what role does the Taliban play in this scenario? 
Chapter IV addresses these questions through an examination of Central Asia's 
political economy. It surveys the political and economic structures of the Soviet era, and 
explains how the Soviet legacy contributes to contemporary problems of political 
oppression and economic stagnation. These problems in turn have given voice to 
political opposition groups, which—as in other states throughout the Islamic world— 
have mobilized against the status quo governments under the banner of Islam.   Lastly, 
this chapter examines the political economy of Central Asian Islamism in the regional 
context of geopolitics, oil and gas markets, and the growth of international crime. From 
this vantage, the derivative impact of the Taliban on the rise of political Islam and 
fundamentalism in Central Asia is discernable. 
Finally, Chapter V draws conclusions from the findings of this study and outlines 
policy recommendations for the Central Asian republics and the United States. It 
recounts some of the issues raised at the outset and raises new questions about the role 
and future direction of political Islam in Central Asia. It is useful first, however, to place 
the paper's main subjects in context. The remainder of this introductory chapter sketches 
the recent histories and defining attributes of both the Taliban and militant 
fundamentalists in Central Asia. 
B. THE TALIBAN: "RECREATING THE TIME OF THE PROPHET" 
In an interview with Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid (one of very few 
journalists who have had access to the Taliban), Mullah Wakil, a senior confidant of 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar, stated: 
The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we 
give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes, and 
weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1,400 years ago and 
jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet and we are 
only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 
years.7 
The deliberate and unabashedly literal fundamentalism implicit in Wakil's 
statement is readily apparent in the Taliban's ascetic social policies.  Over the past five 
years, the Taliban have prohibited women from education and employment, mandated 
7
 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2000), p. 43. 
short haircuts and full beards for men, banned most forms of entertainment and 
recreation, suppressed other Islamic points of view, and established Islamic courts to 
dispense justice according to the Taliban's interpretation of sharia. The Taliban's 
occasional statements and edicts, along with their observable policy actions, indicate 
overwhelming emphasis on two political objectives: transformation of Afghan social 
mores according to the Taliban's interpretation of Islam and prosecution of their ongoing 
civil war. These priorities are pursued at the expense of coherent economic and foreign 
policies. 
No aspect of Taliban rule has attracted as much international scrutiny and 
condemnation as Taliban policy toward women. Upon taking Kabul in 1996, the Taliban 
immediately issued edicts forbidding girls to go to school. According to a human rights 
study by the U.S. State Department, most girls' schools and home-based vocational 
projects have been closed in Taliban-controlled territories. Formerly co-educational 
universities no longer admit women, and the women's university in Kabul has been 
closed. Additionally, many Afghan women are virtually homebound due to the banning 
of women from mosques and most forms of employment, the strictly enforced dress code 
requiring burqas to be worn, and occasionally violent harassment from Taliban-created 
religious police. On the Taliban's official English-language web site, these policies are 
said to "protect the honor, dignity, and freedom" of Afghan women in accordance with 
Islam and Afghan tradition.9 
U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2000 Annual Report 
on International Religious Freedom: Afghanistan, (5 September 2000) [Homepage on-line]; available from 
hnTj://\\-'w^-.state.gov/un\^/global/human rights/irf/irf rpt'irf afghanis.html: accessed 8 December 2000. 
9
 Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, 'Taleban," Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: New York Office [Homepage 
on-line]; available from http://www.taleban.com/taleb.htm: accessed 8 December 2000. 
Though perhaps to a lesser degree, Taliban policies have adversely impacted men 
as well, particularly non-Pashtuns. In Kabul, men were given just six weeks to grow full 
beards (in spite of the fact that some Afghan ethnic groups are incapable of growing 
facial hair), and the mandatory wearing of the shalwar and baggy trousers was imposed. 
Violators have been beaten and arrested in the streets.10 Both Western-influenced 
entertainment (such as movies, radio, and television), and traditional Afghan 
entertainment (including kite-flying, chess, and dancing) have been banned. Toys, 
photographs, and any artwork depicting human beings have been outlawed as un-Islamic. 
In March 2001, the Taliban infamously destroyed two ancient Buddhist statues hewn 
from a cliff side despite unanimous world protest.11 The celebration of traditional 
holidays, such as Nowruz (the Persian/Afghan New Year's) and the Shi'i holy month of 
Muharram, is illegal as well. The display of any kind of festivity was outlawed even for 
Eid al-Fitr, the principle Muslim celebration of the year. 
Religious persecution and harsh application of justice are also typical of the 
Taliban's campaign to recast society in their own image. The Hazara Shia of central 
Afghanistan have been subjected to much violence and oppression. In retaliation for a 
previous conflict that resulted in the deaths of 2,000 Taliban soldiers, the Taliban 
massacred 8,000 Hazara men, women, and children in 1998.13 In May 2000 and January 
2001, the Taliban executed hundreds more Hazara civilians, apparently as collective 
10
 Rashid, Taliban, pp. 114-115. 
11
 Barry Bearak, "Afghan Says Destruction of Buddhas is Complete," The New York Times on the Web (12 
March 2001) [Homepage on-line]; available from 
http://www.nvtimes.coirL/2001 /03/12/world/l2AFGH.html; accessed 12 April 2001. 
12
 Rashid, Taliban, pp. 115-116. 
13
 Michael Sheridan, "How the Taliban Slaughtered 8,000," London Times (1 November 1998); available 
from Lexis-Nexis. 
punishment for local residents whom the Taliban suspected of cooperating with 
opposition forces.14 
All Sunni Muslims are required to pray five times daily; Friday noon prayers at 
mosques are compulsory. Non-Muslims (whose numbers are few and decreasing) are 
required to wear a prominent piece of yellow cloth to differentiate them from Sunnis. 
Islamic courts have been established to dispense swift summary justice in accordance 
with the Taliban's understanding of sharia. Court decisions are final. Offenses such as 
murder, rape, and apostasy are punishable by execution; thieves are subjected to 
amputation; adulterers are whipped 100 times or stoned to death; and men found guilty of 
homosexual acts have been killed by having stone walls toppled over them. All 
punishments, including executions, are held publicly—sometimes in stadiums before 
crowds of 30,000 or more. In many cases, the relatives of victims carry out the 
punishment.15 
In addition to their sweeping imposition of sharia, the Taliban's agenda is 
distinguished by preoccupation with the ongoing civil war. As of April 2001, the Taliban 
have gained control of approximately 95% of Afghanistan's geography. Only the 
northeastern-most portions of the country remain under control of Ahmad Shah Massoud 
and the Northern Alliance. Since 1994, the Taliban, who are of Pashtun ethnicity, have 
gradually defeated all other warring factions. When the Taliban began their campaign for 
control of the country, Burhanuddin Rabbani, a former Mujahidin commander during the 
Soviet-Afghan   War,   was   Afghanistan's   embattled   president.      Though   Pashtuns 
14
 Human Rights Watch, "Massacres of Hazaras in Afghanistan," (19 February 2001) [Homepage on-line]; 
available at http://www.hrw.ora/reports/2001/afghanistan: accessed 16 March 2001. 
15
 U.S. Department of State, 2000 Annual Report. 
10 
(Afghanistan's largest ethnic group) had traditionally held power in Afghanistan, 
Rabbani and his ally, Massoud, are both Tajiks. The Taliban's "jihad" to rid Afghanistan 
of factional violence and lawlessness in the name of Islam thus took on a distinctively 
ethnic and sectarian quality as more and more Pashtuns joined the Taliban in their battle 
against the ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazara Shia, Ismaili Shia, etc. 
The Taliban have demonstrated little interest in aspects of government beyond 
prosecution of their civil war against the Northern Alliance and imposition of sharia. 
According to Freedom House, "The Taliban have largely neglected most functions of 
government and rely on the UN and foreign nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to 
provide basic services, food-for-work programs, mine clearance, and refugee 
repatriation."16 Afghanistan's economic devastation has been compounded by drought 
and famine during the winter of 2000-2001. Nearly 1 million Afghans are at risk of 
starvation, and hundreds of thousands are crowded into refugee camps along the Afghan 
borders with Iran, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. Many have fled back to the same Pakistani 
refugee camps that sheltered Afghans during the Soviet invasion.17 
The Taliban's foreign policies have been equally counterproductive. Their 
support for international terrorism and the narcotics trade is discussed more thoroughly in 
Chapter IV, but it is sufficient here to observe that the Taliban's rigid adherence to such 
"rogue" behavior has succeeded only in alienating Afghanistan from the rest of the 
16
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http://w\^-.freedonAouse.org/resear^ accessed 13 April 
2001. 
17
 Barry Bearak, "Fleeing Famine and War, Afghans Again Meet Death," The New York Times on the Web 
(1 March 2001) [Homepage on-line]; available from: http://V'ww.nvtimes.com/2001/03/01/02AFGH.html; 
accessed 13 April 2001; and Pamela Constable, "Famine Threatens 1 Million People in Afghanistan," 
Washingtonpost.com (22 February 2001) [Homepage on-line]; available from 
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world—including most Islamic states.18 In light of Afghanistan's bleak outlook, it 
remains to be seen whether the Taliban—like the Iranian and Sudanese Islamic 
governments before them—will revert to conventional economic and political models. 
They have yet to establish any viable alternatives. 
C. MILITANT ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
Since acquiring independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, all five Central 
Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan- 
have witnessed a revival of Islamic culture. Of these, only Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan have experienced a proliferation of Islamist opposition parties and militant 
fundamentalist groups, though fear of Islamic insurgency permeates all five governments. 
Central Asia's leaders jealously guard their states' secular status, an inheritance of the 
Soviet legacy that still exerts enormous influence over politics in the region. The rise of 
Islamist and fundamentalist opposition is seen as a growing threat to secular government 
and regional security, and Central Asian leaders—particularly Uzbekistan's Islam 
Karimov—adamantly assert that the Islamist threat emanates from Afghanistan. 
According to President Karimov: 
We need to resist manifestations of extremism and fanaticism on our 
territory . . . First [opposition groups] are being trained in religious 
doctrine and then in modem forms of terrorist activity and then they return 
here ... they have been trained to demand the creation here of a caliphate. 
That is, at the end of the 20th century they want to take us back to the 
reality of the 7th-8th centuries, to the times of the Prophet Muhammad . . . 
We cannot fail to be aware of this threat, and it is being fed by the war in 
Afghanistan and the fanatical Taliban movement.19 
18 Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates recognize the Taliban as the official 
government of Afghanistan. Of these, Saudi Arabia and UAE have increasingly distanced themselves from 
the Taliban in recent years. 
Interview with Islam Karimov by Arkadiy Dubnov, "Perhaps It Is a Shortcoming of Mine That I State 
My Goals in Full," Moscow Vremya, in Russian, 19 October 1998, translated in FBIS (5 November 1998). 
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Kyrgyzstan's President Askar Akayev echoes Karimov's sentiments: "The 
terrorists are trying to get deep into the republic to destabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan 
and all Central Asia ... but we will never allow anyone to trample on our holy land with 
weapons in their hands." 
Despite their fierce competition for access to Central Asia's oil and gas resources, 
major regional and extra-regional powers are united in their concern over the Taliban and 
Islamic insurgency in Central Asia. Russia, the United States, Iran, China, Turkey, and 
India, all of which seek political influence in the region, have accused the Taliban of 
fomenting Islamic terrorism in Central Asia. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Vyacheslav Trubnikov attended an emergency meeting of the Central Asian presidents in 
January 2001 to discuss strategies for countering "aggression" from "Afghan-based 
Islamist insurgents who have staged incursions into the region." Under the aegis of the 
"Shanghai Five" security alliance, China has joined the Russian and Central Asian 
presidents in previous summits to address the same concerns.21 In September 2000, the 
US State Department added the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) to its list of 28 
foreign terrorist organizations. In a statement announcing this decision, a State 
Department spokesman said that "IMU fighters have trained in camps in Afghanistan, 
some controlled by Usama bin Laden," and that the IMU "receives assistance from the 
20
 "Kyrgyz President Says Rebels Threatening Regional Stability," Agence France Presse (31 August 
2000); available from Lexis-Nexis. 
21
 Anthony Davis, "Afghanistan Top of Central Asia Security Agenda," Jane's Defence Weekly (17 January 
2001); available from Lexis-Nexis. Turkmenistan's Saparmurad Niyazov, who has developed a cordial 
relationship with the Taliban in hopes of eventually building oil and gas pipelines through Afghanistan, 
abstained from both the Shanghai Five and the January 2001meeting. 
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Taliban and other groups and individuals based in Afghanistan."22 That month, General 
Tommy Franks, commander in chief of the US Central Command, pledged new military 
aid to Uzbekistan, stating, "The fighting in Afghanistan is a threat to security in the 
whole region."23 Uzbekistan also accepts military assistance from China, while 
substantial Russian forces are stationed on Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. In 
December 2000, the United States and Russia jointly led the United Nations in a measure 
to impose further punitive sanctions against the Taliban. India, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan cosponsored this resolution, which passed without objection. (China abstained 
in order to support the measure without contradicting the general Chinese policy of 
opposition to UN sanctions.)24 
In short, the governments of Central Asia have touted Islamic militancy as a threat 
that is both exigent and essentially foreign (i.e., sponsored and encouraged by the 
Taliban). Outside powers, particularly the United States, Russia, and China, have 
accepted this assessment and structured their Central Asian policies accordingly. A 
general consensus has emerged among Central Asian states and the major world powers 
that Taliban-style fundamentalism presents a threat to stability in Central Asia. The 
validity of this assumption will be taken up in the following chapters. The remainder of 
this section surveys recent conflicts between militant Islamic groups and the Central 
Asian governments. 
Statement by Richard Boucher, U.S. Department of State (15 September 2000) [Homepage on-line]; 
available fromhttp://secretary.state.gov/w\\'\v/,briefings/statements/2000/ps000915b.html- accessed 4 ' 
March 2001. 
23
 Ahmed Rashid, "On the Spot," Far Eastern Economic Review 163:42 (19 October 2000) [journal on- 
line]; available from http://www.feer.com/ 0010 19/p28region.html: accessed 14 March 2001. 
See Resolution 1333, SC/6979, United Nations Security Council (19 December 2000) [Homepage on- 
line]; available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/sc6979.doc.htm: accessed 14 March 2001. 
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The Tajik civil war, which raged from 1992 until 1997, served as a primary 
catalyst for Central Asia's contemporary Islamic political violence.25 This conflict is 
often mischaracterized—or at least oversimplified—as a war between militant Islamic 
fundamentalists and the secular communist government. In fact, Tajikistan's civil war 
entailed a more complex clash of political, economic, ethnic, and regional interests. 
Islamists and fundamentalists constituted one faction of a broader anti-government 
coalition of nationalists, democrats, and cultural revivalists. The conflict caused many 
Tajik refugees and opposition fighters to flee over the border into northern Afghanistan, 
where they were sheltered by rival Mujahidin factions such as those of the Afghan Tajik 
Ahmad Shah Massoud and the Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum. Eventually, these refugee 
camps became rear bases for the Islamist elements of the United Tajik Opposition 
(UTO).26 
Meanwhile, in Uzbekistan, an Islamic political movement called Adolat 
("Justice") organized demonstrations in the Ferghana Valley city of Namangan. As the 
civil war in neighboring Tajikistan raised the Uzbek government's anxiety, President 
Karimov cracked down not only on Adolat, but also on other Islamic groups that engaged 
in much less political activity. By the end of 1992, Uzbekistan had begun to drive its 
Islamic opposition into Tajikistan and Afghanistan, where these elements became more 
militant. Many joined the UTO in its struggle against the secular Tajik government.  In 
25
 While Tajikistan's civil war contributed heavily to the radicalization of current Islamic opposition 
groups, it did not mark the naissance of political or fundamentalist Islam in Central Asia. The deeper 
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(Osh/Brussels, 1 March 2001), p iv. Available on-line at 
hrtp://www.crisisweb.org/proiects/asia/'centralasia''reports/A400245 01032001.pdf (accessed 3 March 
2001). 
15 
June 1997, the Tajik government and the UTO formally ended their civil war with the 
establishment of an interim coalition government charged with implementing peace 
agreements and repatriating refugees. The peace process has been far from perfect, but 
most exiled UTO leaders and tens of thousands of refugees have returned from 
Afghanistan.27 After the rapprochement between Tajik government officials and most 
Tajik Islamists, the militant Uzbeks in Tajikistan and Afghanistan shifted their campaign 
back to the Uzbek government. Uzbek militants, loosely organized as the Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan (MU), have been responsible for most of the political violence 
that has rocked Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in recent years. 
Relatively little is known about the MU. The group's political leader is Tokhir 
Yuldashev, a former leader of Adolat, and the military commander is Juma Namangani, a 
native Uzbek who was a major leader of the militant UTO fighters. Since 1993, 
Namangani is alleged to have received training in Afghan Mujahidin camps. He is also 
believed to have received training from both Pakistani and Saudi intelligence officials.28 
Estimates of EMU membership range from as little as 100 up to several thousand, though 
most sources place the total membership at about 2,000.29 Beginning in 1999, the IMU 
initiated several incursions into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan and 
Afghanistan.   Most of the violence has occurred in the Ferghana Valley, a historically 
Human Rights Watch, "Tajikistan: Human Rights Developments," in World Report 2001 (Human Rights 
Watch, 2001) [Homepage on-line]; available at http://www.hru-.or^wr2kl/europe/taiikistan.html: accessed 
19 March 2001. For detailed analysis of the Tajik peace process, see also R. Grant Smith, "Tajikistan: The 
Rocky Road to Peace," Central Asian Survey 18:2 (June 1999), pp. 243-250. 
28
 See "Uzbekistan Politics: Islamist Insurgence," EIU Viewswire (21 Sep 2000), available from Lexis- 
Nexis; and International Crisis Group, "Recent Violence In Central Asia: Causes and Consequences" 
(Central Asia/Brussels, 18 October 2000), p. 3. Available on-line at: 
hrrpv'/^^w.crisisweb.org/proiects/asia/centralasia^reports/: accessed 3 March 2001. 
See, for example, International Crisis Group, "Recent Violence in Central Asia," p. 5, and Ahmed 
Rashid, "Central Asia Crisis Talks Over Islamic 'Invasion'," The Daily Telegraph (11 January 2001); 
available from Lexis-Nexis. 
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religious region that is shared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Interstate 
borders in Ferghana are circuitous and porous (see Figure 1), which has exacerbated the 
insurgency problem and drawn all three countries into the conflict. 
The IMU first became militarily active after a series of bombs exploded in 
Tashkent in February 1999. Within an hour and a half, six bombs detonated at 
symbolically important buildings throughout the city—one of the explosions occurred at 
a site where President Karimov's motorcade was about to arrive. The attacks remain 
unresolved, but the Uzbek government quickly blamed them on Islamist insurgents and 
initiated a series of sweeping arrests. IMU leader Tokhir Yuldashev denied responsibility 
for the bombings, though he warned that more such bombings would occur if Karimov 
did not step down.30 A non-violent Islamist opposition group, Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islamii, 
also denied responsibility, though many of its members and associates were arrested in 
the wake of the incident.31 
Beginning in August 1999, the IMU led a series of armed incursions in and 
around the Ferghana Valley. On 6 August, several Kyrgyz officials were taken hostage 
and released a week later after a ransom of $50,000 was paid. On 22 August, several 
dozen hostages were taken, including a Kyrgyz general and four Japanese geologists. 
After military retaliation from Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, as well as a reported $6 
million ransom from Japan, the insurgents withdrew and released the hostages.   Their 
30
 Several factors have contributed to suspicion that Karimov's security apparatus engineered the Tashkent 
attacks in order to justify a crackdown on Islamist opposition. First, none of the assailants involved in any 
of the six bombings were apprehended, despite the crowded and secure areas in which most of the attacks 
occurred. The precise timing, incredible breaches of security, and coincidence with other political 
developments have also generated speculation. See International Crisis Group, Central Asia: Islamist 
Mobilization, pp. 5-6. 
31
 Hizb-ut-Tahrir is an international movement that is active throughout the Muslim world. It advocates 
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Figure 1. Map of Central Asia with Detail of the Ferghana Valley. (From Nancy 
Lubin and Barnett R. Rubin, Calming the Ferghana Valley: Development and 
Dialogue in the Hear of Central Asia (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 
1999) 
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reason for the invasion and hostage taking was the demand to pass freely through Kyrgyz 
territory in order to penetrate Uzbekistan. 
The Uzbek and Kyrgyz militaries engaged the IMU in several cross-border 
skirmishes in August and September of 2000. During this period, IMU fighters 
temporarily occupied two villages in Uzbekistan, attacked an Uzbek police outpost, and 
kidnapped American mountain climbers in Kyrgyzstan.32 On 14 August 2000, the IMU 
issued a list of demands to the Uzbek government. These included the release of all IMU 
members imprisoned in Uzbekistan, the reopening of mosques that had been shut down 
by the Uzbek government, the sanctioning of Muslim dress in Uzbekistan, and the 
implementation of shana. 
As winter set in, the IMU forces retreated through Tajikistan to Afghanistan, 
where they were believed to have received refuge from the Taliban until further attacks 
could be conducted in the spring of 2001. The BVIU maintains offices in Kabul and 
military training camps in Taliban-controlled Afghan territory.34 The Taliban have 
rebuffed official Uzbek requests for extradition of Yuldashev and Namangani.35 There is 
no question, then, that some sort of relationship exists between the Taliban and the IMU. 
The nature and extent of this relationship, however, is subject to dispute. 
32
 This kidnapping precipitated the U.S. State Department's addition of the IMU to its list of international 
terrorists. 
33
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II. THE TALIBAN AND AFGHANISTAN 
Western journalists and politicians typically characterize the Taliban regime as 
another manifestation of Islamic fundamentalism. This depiction, while not entirely 
inaccurate, is doubly problematic: first, as commonly understood and applied in the West, 
the term "fundamentalism" reinforces negative stereotypes of Islam generally, which is 
too often perceived as monolithic, anachronistic, and violently anti-Western. Second, 
and more importantly, the fundamentalist label (or any label with exclusively Islamic 
connotations) fails to capture the unique set of circumstances that has informed the 
Taliban's severe and unyielding belief system—circumstances that distinguish the 
Taliban and their destructive behavior from other Islamic movements. 
Though outsiders from Uzbekistan to the United States may characterize the 
Taliban as typical fundamentalists, and the Taliban may indeed regard themselves in 
deliberately (if not exclusively) Islamic terms, this chapter contends that the Taliban's 
interpretations of religion and authority are extremely idiosyncratic, and have less to do 
with any commonly accepted Islamic doctrine than with secular factors such as tribal 
custom and the sociological repercussions of warfare. Accordingly, Taliban ideology 
would be an irrelevant and improbable development outside the borders of Afghanistan. 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the Taliban regime has sought to impose 
its austere interpretation of sharia on the Afghan population as a whole—regardless of 
sectarian, cultural, or ethnic distinctions between Afghan citizens.  They have come to 
36
 Though not the subject of this study, Pakistan is the most significant exception to the argument that 
Taliban ideology is unlikely to proliferate in neighboring states. Pakistan is the only country that shares 
close ethnic, religious, and historical traits with Afghanistan and the Taliban. As this chapter will 
demonstrate, Pakistan was an integral part of the Taliban's genesis. If Taliban-style fundamentalism does 
present a threat to any other state, Pakistan is most at risk. 
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power via military victory over rival factions and conquest of all Afghan provinces, an 
endeavor that they consider jihad. Though indeed religious from the Taliban's point of 
view, their civil war/jihad also entails ethnic undercurrents. The Taliban's conception of 
Islam, then, is ascetic, compulsory, and non-negotiable; and their political legitimacy 
derives from self-proclaimed religious devotion, their ethnic status, and growing 
monopoly of coercive force. The first two sections of this chapter contrast these 
interpretations of Islam and political authority with conventional Afghan Islamic culture. 
Traditional Afghan Islam has been distinctly moderate and tolerant, while strains of 
political Islam in Afghanistan have essentially mirrored Islamist movements throughout 
the Muslim world. The third section examines the ideological and sociological origins of 
the Taliban movement—origins rooted in the violence and alienation resulting from 
twenty years of constant warfare. 
A. TRADITIONAL AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN AFGHANISTAN 
Generally speaking, Islam in Afghanistan has been practiced and understood in 
both traditional (or popular) terms and more ideological, politicized terms. Islam is 
inextricably intertwined with Afghan custom and world-view; as such, it plays an integral 
role in the legitimization of political authority. The basic attributes of traditional Afghan 
Islam, the development and impact of political Islam, and the nature of Afghan political 
authority are the subjects of this section. 
As Roy cautions, it would be a mistake to draw too distinct a contrast between 
traditional/popular religion and political Islam. Not only has Afghanistan historically 
been comprised of a variety of Islamic traditions and cultures, but there is often much 
overlap between traditional Afghan Islam and the fundamentalist or politicized variants 
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that derive from it. Accordingly, "traditional Islam" will be used here to designate the 
broadest common denominators among Afghan understanding and practice of Islam; an 
Islam "which derives from a world-view common to all [Afghan] social categories, 
which provides the basis for the more intellectual constructions of the 'ulama (Muslim 
law) and the intellectuals (Islamist ideology)."37 Ralph Magnus and Eden Naby 
distinguish traditional Islam as encompassing "all Afghan political players who were 
specifically not bound within Marxism or conscientiously and deliberately Islamists. 
■JO 
Most Afghans would fall within this category whether they are Sunni or Shi'a." 
Given these conceptual parameters, several factors have affected traditional 
understandings of Islam across sectarian or ethnic lines in Afghanistan. These include 
ethnic and religious diversity, the diffusion of society over rugged terrain that virtually 
isolates some tribes and villages, and the prominence of Sufism. Together, these (and 
undoubtedly other) factors have contributed to an Islamic tradition that is notably 
tolerant, personal and localized, and relatively apolitical. 
Islam is virtually the only thing that all Afghans have in common. Apart from 
several thousand Hindus, Sikhs, and a few hundred Jews, all Afghans are Muslims. Of 
these, approximately 80 percent are Sunnis of the comparatively liberal Hanafi juridical 
system. The remaining 20 percent are comprised of Twelver and Ismaili Shias. Despite 
the overwhelming majority of Hanafi Sunnis, which might seem to suggest a relatively 
homogeneous population, Afghanistan's demography is further complicated by a wide 
array of ethnic groups that break down into a wider array of tribal factions—most of 
37
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which adhere to distinct identities and some of which are rivals. The many tribes of the 
Pashtun majority are predominantly Sunnis, as are most Tajiks and Turkic ethnic groups. 
The Hazaras, Qizilbash, and some Tajiks adhere to Shi'ism. Fifteen or more smaller 
ethnic groups are also scattered throughout Afghanistan. Further dividing these religious 
and ethnic groups is a bewildering assortment of languages and dialects spanning several 
language families, from Indo-Persian to Turkic to Mongolian.39 
While Islam is the sole element binding these disparate groups together (albeit 
tenuously), these many religious and ethnic distinctions have prevented any centralized, 
uniform interpretation of Islam from coalescing and taking root throughout Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan's rugged geography, which segregates many ethnic groups and tribes from 
one another, has also contributed to the decentralized nature of traditional Islam. 
Allegiance to Islam, then, has been imbedded in the community level of tribe, village, 
and family—not in any centrally organized notion of religious doctrine. Specific 
religious practices have therefore varied from region to region depending on local 
interpretation.40 
Though typically decried by fundamentalists such as the Taliban and the Saudi 
Wahhabis, Sufism has long been a popular and influential component of Afghan religious 
tradition. Mobile Sufi networks, particularly those of the Naqshbandiyya order, have 
served as moderating forces among the various ethnic and tribal groups. 41   Sufism has 
39
 Magnus and Naby, pp. 9-17. 
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private and apolitical matter for most Afghan Muslims. 
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penetrated most religious and ethnic traditions in Afghanistan except for Shia groups. 
Roy suggests that the anti-clericalism of Afghan Sufis held enduring appeal for 
traditional   Afghans,   who   appreciated   the   unobtrusive   way   in   which   Sufism 
accommodated their local religious and tribal customs.43 
The integral yet decentralized and temperate character of traditional Islam in 
Afghanistan is well summarized by Rashid: 
Islam has always been at the very center of the lives of ordinary Afghan 
people. Whether it is saying one's prayers five times a day, fasting in 
Ramadan or giving zakat... few Muslim peoples in the world observe the 
rituals and the piety of Islam with such regularity and emotion as the 
Afghans . . . But no Afghan can insist that the fellow Muslim standing 
next to him prays also. Traditionally Islam in Afghanistan has been 
immensely tolerant—to other Muslim sects, other religions and modem 
lifestyles. Afghan mullahs were never known to push Islam down 
people's throats and sectarianism was not an issue until recently. 
Referring to the Taliban, Rashid continues: "For the first time in Afghanistan's 
history the unifying factor of Islam has become a lethal weapon in the hands of 
extremists, a force for division, fragmentation and enormous blood-letting.' 
Though traditional Islam remained by far the prevalent religious culture amongst 
most Afghans, reactionary movements employing Islam as a political ideology also 
evolved over time. Like other Muslim countries in the early twentieth century, 
Afghanistan was host to a wave of intellectual and political thinking (salafiyya) aimed at 
the problems of Western imperialism, modernization, and the comparative failures of the 
Islamic world.   In Afghanistan, at least two factors contributed to this development. 
42
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First, the return of former exiles introduced the modernist Islamic thinking of Jamal al- 
Din al-Afghani, Sayyid Ahmad Khan, and the Young Turks. The second factor was 
Afghanistan's long-standing ideological connection to India, where many Afghan ulama 
had traditionally been educated in the Deoband school.46 The Deoband tradition, which 
combined theological fundamentalism with strong anti-colonial pan-Islamism, was 
crucial to the development of both traditional and political Islam in Afghanistan. 
(Deobandism, incidentally, accepted and incorporated Sufism, which distinguishes it 
from the exclusive fundamentalism of the Wahhabis or the Taliban.)47 
Certain attributes are common to the political Islamists of the early twentieth 
century, and these qualities stand in sharp contrast to the modem-day Taliban. First, both 
the modernists and the pan-Islamists were comprised of educated members of the Afghan 
ulama and intelligentsia. Second, these movements conceived of Islam in broad 
sociopolitical terms. Whether from a religiously orthodox or modernist perspective, they 
advocated sweeping agendas aimed at transforming, liberating, and modernizing the 
Afghan nation. 
According to Magnus and Naby, "It is useful to note that in every case in which 
Islamic revivalism has succeeded, regardless of the range within the spectrum of Islamic 
traditionalism and Islamist idealism, the societal context has been either extreme 
secularism or pro-Marxism."48 Prominent examples include the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt and Syria during the 1960s, and Khomeini in 1970s Iran. Such was the case with 
Afghanistan as well.    In the wake of the pan-Islamic movement, Afghanistan had 
^ Asta Olesen, Islam and Politics in Afghanistan (Richmond: Curzon Press Ltd, 1995), p. 107. 
Roy, Islam and Resistance, pp. 57-58. 
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proceeded for several decades on a program of intermittent and increasingly secular 
modernization. By the 1960s, Afghanistan was becoming more and more dependent on 
Soviet patronage. This patronage was accompanied by the rise of pro-Soviet Marxist 
parties in Afghanistan, who would come to power in a 1978 coup d'etat. Though a 
minority movement, Islamism developed in opposition to secular modernization and 
especially Marxism. 
Afghan Islamism essentially mirrored the Islamist movements arising throughout 
the Middle East at this time. Consistent with the political economy theory of Islamic 
discontent, Afghan Islamists were young, recently urbanized, educated (typically in 
engineering or some other science), and thoroughly disenchanted with the economic 
failures of modernization efforts.49 They based their ideology on the writings of 
influential Islamists such as Egypt's Sayyid Qutb, Pakistan's Mawlana Maududi, and 
even Ayatollah Khomeini—whose revolutionary movement was seen as an inspiration in 
spite of its Shi'i orientation.50 Like their fellow Islamists in other countries, the Afghan 
movement was a distinctly modern phenomenon. "For them, the problem is to develop a 
modern political ideology based on Islam, which they see as the only way to come to 
terms with the modern world and the best means of confronting foreign imperialism." 
Though many Islamist leaders, including Hekmatyar and Rabbani, went on to 
become prominent Mujahidin commanders in the Soviet-Afghan War, Islamism in 
Afghanistan never attracted a substantial following.   Attempted counter-coups by the 
49
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university-based Islamists were not supported by traditional peasant masses or the ulama, 
which did not consider the Islamists to be the bulwark of Islam.52 
Like the Islamic modernists and pan-Islamists that preceded them, the 
contemporary Afghan Islamists envisioned Islam as a comprehensive social, political, 
and economic system. Though they rejected many of the Western influences of their 
predecessors, the Islamists sought to instill Islamic society as a viable alternative to 
secular capitalist democracy and atheist communism. The Islamists' modern, politicized 
outlook contrasts with the ascetic, fundamentalist preoccupations of the Taliban; and their 
failure to attract the vast, rural segments of society underscores the dominance of 
traditional, tribal Islam in Afghan society. 
B. POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN AFGHANISTAN 
Given the centrality of religion to the lives of Afghans and the history of the 
Afghan state, leaders and their regimes have never been able to secure the legitimacy of 
their rule without coming to terms with Islam. This is not to suggest, however, that 
Afghans have historically perceived their political leaders in religious terms or their 
religious figures in political terms. On the contrary, political legitimacy in Afghanistan 
has depended on the leader's ability to strike the proper balance between Islam and 
political administration. The leader must protect and defend Islam, but mustn't assume 
the mantle of religious authority for himself. Likewise, the leader must administer the 
affairs of state, but not interfere with tribal custom and authority. A legitimate Afghan 
leader, then, is one who rules on the periphery and defends Islam when it is threatened by 
Roy, Islam and Resistance, p. 76. Incidentally, the establishment of Mujahidin political parties marks a 
distinction between the Islamists and the Taliban, the latter of which believe political parties are un-Islamic. 
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outside forces. To best understand this notion of political legitimacy, it is necessary to 
examine three important shapers of political authority: tribal politics, the role of the 
religious establishment, and the Afghan tradition of jihad. 
Afghanistan's founding Durrani empire (1747-1818) derived power from its tribal 
constituents, and had no interest in enforcing a particular form of religious interpretation 
through the power of the state. It was taken for granted that the state was Islamic, but 
Islam was not the key determinant of the state's legitimacy. Tribal law was at least as 
authoritative as sharia.52 Afghanistan's founding myth is that of the loya Jirga, a 
defining element of tribal politics in Afghanistan. According to lore, Afghanistan's 
Durrani leaders were selected by the jirga, an assembly of all tribal warriors. The elected 
leader was first and foremost a warrior chief, and his relationship with his followers was 
contractual; he ruled with their consent.54 The extent to which the loya jirga has been 
exaggerated and idealized over the course of time is debatable, but its influence on 
Afghan politics is evident. In the twentieth century, Afghan tribes (especially the 
Durranis and other Pashtuns) continued to see the central power as their representative. 
The state existed on the periphery but was "no more than the means of continuity. As far 
as their own territory [was] concerned, the presence of the state would seem to be 
redundant and totally unnecessary."55 In recent history, both the Afghan Marxist regime 
and the subsequent Mujahidin commanders have invoked the loya jirga tradition in hopes 
of gaining legitimacy.56 
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From the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, Islam emerged in Afghanistan as 
the dominant discourse in response to the rise of European imperialism, the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire, and the twentieth century dilemmas of modernity and Westernization. 
The new ascendancy of Islam, however, was mostly symbolic; the power of the religious 
establishment did not increase significantly, and a centralized, state-imposed religious 
interpretation did not emerge.57 This development has much to do with the persistence of 
traditional Islam and the culturally accepted roles of local mullahs and the ulama 
establishment. 
The role of the ulama in Afghanistan has never been explicitly political. They 
have historically supported any ruling regime as long as its policies were generally 
consistent with sharia and it defended the Afghan umma from outside threats. Except 
amongst some minority Shia, the ulama have never had any intention to create a 
theocratic state. Their moral authority and concern for civil society have been 
important in Afghan society, but the ulama have never had a formal hierarchy or any 
national level organization. Consequently, for most Afghan citizens, religious affairs 
were administered by local mullahs and Sufi pirs.59 
The traditional Afghan mullah, first and foremost, is a member of the village and 
not the ulama clergy. He is not connected to any institutionalized body—religious or 
political—and is selected to serve by the collective decision of his village. He has a 
monopoly on all local religious activities, frequently mediates disputes, and typically 
administers education.    He may not, however, exercise any political power.60   The 
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relative removal of the ulama from local religion, as well as the apolitical roles of both 
the ulama and the village mullahs, contribute significantly to the localized nature of 
traditional Islam in Afghanistan. 
The extent to which the Taliban have violated Afghan notions of religious and 
political propriety is evident in Mullah Omar's claim to the Islamic title, 'Commander of 
the Faithful.' In April 1996, Omar appeared on the roof of a building in Kandahar, 
wrapped in the Cloak of the Prophet, which had not been removed from its shrine for 
many decades. While Omar's devout followers cheered his self-proclamation, most 
Afghans saw the incident as "a serious affront to propriety that a poor village mullah with 
no scholarly learning, no tribal pedigree or connections to the Prophet's family should 
presume so much . . . Moreover, there was no sanction for such a title in Islam, unless all 
of the country's ulama had bestowed it upon a leader." 
In addition to tribal politics and the traditional roles of religious actors, the 
Afghan interpretation of jihad is an important part of legitimate political authority. 
Political leaders have historically succeeded in bolstering Afghan solidarity through 
appeals to jihad. As previously mentioned, part of the ruler's legitimacy indeed stems 
from his protection of the Afghan umma against infidel threats. As Roy emphasizes, 
however, there is a crucial distinction in Afghan culture between jihad and tribal warfare. 
Jihad implies a shift in power relations away from tribal leaders (khan) and toward non- 
tribal charismatic leaders, who rose above tribal politics and inspired loyalty through a 
combination of Islamic zeal and superior military command. While tribal warfare may 
involve coalitions between tribes, it is inter-tribal in nature and motivated by vengeance 
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or political gain. Jihad, on the other hand, unites Afghan tribes against a common 
external threat.62 (Though most Islamic movements throughout the Middle East have 
interpreted jihad as extending to illegitimate domestic regimes, this interpretation has not 
been common in Afghan history.) During the Soviet-Afghan War, the spirit of jihad was 
successfully superimposed over the existing ethnic, tribal, religious, and political 
divisions in the heterogeneous Afghan population. When the Soviets left, however, the 
jihad quickly devolved into violent tribal warfare.63 
Following the Afghan warriors of the Great Game and the Islamists of the Soviet- 
Afghan War, the Taliban have cloaked their violent crusade in the sacred mantle of jihad. 
Unlike these previous conflicts, however, the Taliban's jihad smacks of ethnic tribal 
warfare. 
The Taliban were acting in the spirit of the Prophet's jihad when they 
attacked the rapacious warlords around them. Yet jihad does not sanction 
the killing of fellow Muslims on the basis of ethnicity or sect and it is this, 
the Taliban interpretation of jihad, which appalls the non-Pashtuns. While 
the Taliban claim they are fighting a jihad against corrupt, evil Muslims, 
the ethnic minorities see them as using Islam as a cover to exterminate 
non-Pashtuns.64 
The Taliban's imposed neofundamentalism, then, is at odds not only with the 
decentralized, tolerant nature of traditional Afghan Islam and the ideological modernity 
of Islamism, but with all notions of legitimate political authority as well. To be sure, 
Afghanistan has seen its share of tribal conquerors and palace coups, but the Taliban's 
military conquest is totally inconsistent with the theoretical traditions of the loya jirga 
and tribal dynasties.   Their political and religious intrusion into all spheres of Afghan 
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society—from the urban centers of state power all the way down to the tribal village and 
family—is without precedent. The elevation of semi-literate village mullahs to political 
prominence is equally unorthodox. Finally, the Taliban's questionable version of jihad, 
conducted first against outlaw warlords but increasingly against all non-Pashtun and/or 
non-Sunni resistance, contradicts the historical Afghan notion of jihad. 
If the Taliban are not the products of conventional Afghan sociological 
influences—religious or political, then perhaps the basis for their unusual 
neofundamentalism can be found in the unique sociological circumstances of their 
development and rise to power. 
C. THE TALIBAN: CHILDREN OF WAR 
According to the Taliban's official web site, the Taliban movement has existed 
since the Saur Revolution of 1978, when they "used preaching and religious guidance as 
the major means of fighting against the atheist ideology and corruption." After the Red 
Army invaded in 1979, "the Taliban played a paramount role in mobilizing, planning, and 
directing the holy jihad."65 This version of history is only half true, and even the true half 
is greatly exaggerated. The oldest members of the Taliban regime, including Mullah 
Omar, are currently in their 30s and early 40s. Many of these individuals, again 
including Omar, indeed fought in the Soviet-Afghan War. They were not major 
commanders, however, and did not even constitute their own Mujahidin faction. The few 
Taliban that fought in the war joined the more prominent Pashtun tribal factions and 
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earned their war wounds as foot soldiers.66 These older Taliban were rural Durrani 
Pashtuns. Some of them—most notably Omar—were village mullahs. The vast majority 
of the Taliban constituency did not fight in the war at all. They were too young, and 
spent most of their lives outside of their war torn homeland in the refugee camps of 
Peshawar and Quetta in neighboring Pakistan. 
The Taliban, then, are a coalition of "backwoods" Durrani Pashtuns and young 
war refugees. The culture of the rural Durranis is shaped by Pashtunwali (the tribal code 
of the Pashtuns), which in many ways is more severe than sharia in its restrictions and 
prescribed behaviors. As former refugees, the younger Taliban are the legacy of 20 years 
of constant warfare: they are alienated from Afghan society and culture; they grew up 
illiterate and unfamiliar with the opposite sex; and they were indoctrinated in refugee 
camps with a bizarre hybrid of radical Pakistani Deobandism and Saudi Wahhabism. Far 
more than anything in traditional or political Islam, this potent union of conservative 
Pashtunwali with the estranged children of war is responsible for the Taliban's draconian 
"Islamic" agenda. 
Given the fact that Pashtuns comprise the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, it 
must be acknowledged that Pashtunwali, in and of itself, is certainly not new or alien to 
Afghan culture. Indeed, Pashtunwali was central to the founding concept of the Loya 
Jirga, and has at times complimented or conflicted with Afghan sharia throughout 
history.      Pashtunwali has been practiced, however, in varying degrees across the 
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Pashtun belt and has certainly never governed the processes of non-Pashtuns. The rural 
Durranis, who come from "the poorest, most conservative and least literate southern 
Pashtun provinces of Afghanistan," have been virtually untouched by modernity. 
Unlike other Pashtun tribes from other regions—particularly more urbanized groups—the 
Durrani tribal Pashtuns proudly adhere to a very old canon of Pashtunwali; a canon 
unattenuated by social change or even Islam. 
Literally meaning "way of the Pashtun," Pashtunwali is both an ideology and a 
body of law.   In essence, it is a chivalrous code of behavior revolving around the key 
concepts of honor (namus), notions of dishonor (pighur) and shame (sharm), and the 
equality and freedom of the male individual, who autonomously controls his immediate 
family within the tribe.   Individuals are not technically Pashtun by descent alone; they 
must continuously demonstrate their "Pashtun-ness" on a daily basis through honorable 
behavior.69 According to orthodox Pashtuns, there is no contradiction between Islam and 
Pashtunwali: 
Paradise in Islam is acquired through Pashtu [a verb form of Pashtun, 
meaning 'do' or 'practice Pashtun'] ... the countless graces of Paradise 
come through Pashtu to the Pashtuns. A Pashtun is by definition a 
Muslim; hence, Pashtunness and Muslimness do not have to coalesce; they 
are within each other and the interiority of the former is assumed in the 
latter.70 
As a matter of praxis, however, there are and have always been certain sharp 
contradictions between Islamic sharia and Pashtunwali. Due to the exalted centrality of 
honor and shame amongst conservative Pashtuns, Pashtunwali prescribes strict measures 
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for keeping these concepts in proper equilibrium. Such measures often exceed or 
contradict provisions of sharia. Blood vengeance and the treatment of women are 
prominent juridical areas where Pashtunwali deviates from sharia. (Notably, these are 
two of the most significant factors that distinguish the Taliban's policies from those of 
other Islamic regimes.) Granted, honor is a crucial concept throughout Islamic society; 
many Islamic states impose severe punishments and many Muslim males tie their own 
honor to that of their female relatives. Nonetheless, Pashtunwali is unique in its excess 
and deviation from commonly accepted Islamic principles. 
First, vengeance (badat) is commanded by the Pashtun code, while the sharia 
attempts to limit the occasions on which it can take place.71 Generally speaking, 
Pashtunwali punishment is based on "the revenge of degradations of personal integrity 
rather than on the precise punishment of derelicts laid down in the sharia and its 
definitions of punishment as communal interest."72 The Taliban's fervor for 
Pashtunwali-style vengeance is evident in both their bloody retributions against rival 
factions and their fervor for frequent whippings, amputations, and executions conducted 
as public entertainment in large sports stadiums. The fact that victims or relatives of 
victims usually carry out the punishments further underscores the influence of 
Pashtunwali. 
Second, and more complex, is Pashtunwali's handling of women and gender 
issues. According to the sharia, adultery requires at least four witnesses if it is to be 
proven, while hearsay alone constitutes sufficient proof under Pashtunwali. Pashtun 
women are strictly forbidden from inheriting property, which would contradict the crucial 
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tribal principle of patrilineage. The Qur'an, in contrast, grants to women half the share of 
the male.73    Purdah, literally meaning "curtain," is the guiding principle of gender 
relations in Pashtunwali. Purdah is: 
the physical and symbolic isolation of the Pashtun women from the 
outside world, through confinement to the home or screening-off by a veil 
or all-covering garment (burqa) . . . Control of the women is one of the 
central elements of the basis of a man's and an agnatic family's honor . .. 
women are perceived as the passive property of men, a view that is widely 
expressed and shared by Pashtun men.74 
Again, this protective and heavily restrictive view of women is not uncommon in 
the Islamic world, but orthodox Pashtuns are distinguished by the degree to which they 
restrict their women.   In addition to the un-Islamic absence of legal rights for women, 
Pashtunwali gives men free reign to use corporal punishment and, in the case of adultery, 
kill their wives.75    Given the low (and un-Islamic) burden of proof for adultery, it 
theoretically doesn't take much for a man to kill his wife legally.  When Mullah Omar 
and his Taliban followers came to power, they 
transposed their own milieu, their own experience, or lack of it, with 
women, to the entire country and justified their policies through the Koran 
. .. But in a country so diverse in its ethnicity and levels of development, 
there was no universal standard of tradition or culture for women's role in 
society. Nor had any Afghan ruler before the Taliban ever insisted on 
such dress codes as compulsory beards for men and the burqa. 
Considering   the   tendency   of Pashtuns   to   make   no   distinction   between 
Pashtunwali and Islamic law, it becomes apparent that the Taliban have justified a 
relatively secular and extremely idiosyncratic view of women in broad religious terms. 
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Turning now from Pashtunwali to the circumstances of refugee camp life during 
the anti-Soviet war, one can observe other unique sociological phenomena that have 
influenced the Taliban. Poor education, segregation of genders, unusual religious 
indoctrination, psychological trauma ("shell shock"), and general alienation from Afghan 
culture are predominant features of the camp milieu. 
Both in the camps and in Afghanistan, the education of an entire generation was 
one of many casualties of the war. Throughout the twentieth century, Afghan education 
had been steadily expanding as public schools and state universities increasingly 
augmented the traditional village madrasas administered by mullahs and the religious 
institutions of the ulama. Illiteracy has always been the norm in the more remote parts of 
Afghanistan, but the war drastically worsened this problem as teachers joined the 
resistance, schools closed, and families fled for Pakistan.77 By the mid-1990s, after many 
years of anti-Soviet war and internecine conflict, 90 percent of girls and 60 percent of 
boys were illiterate.    Countless schools had been destroyed.78    (The Taliban thus 
aggravated an ongoing crisis when they closed most of the remaining schools and 
universities—especially those for women.)  Education in the refugee camps was sparse 
and inconsistent.   Semi-literate Afghan or Pakistani mullahs administered most of it. 
History, mathematics, and science were neglected in favor of religious teachings, which 
varied from traditional to Islamist to fundamentalist, depending on the teacher or 
sponsoring organization.  (Educational sponsors ranged from Islamist Mujahidin parties 
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to Saudi Wahhabi groups and Pakistani Islamists.)79 Of the various schools established in 
the camps, girls typically comprised about 6 percent of the student population. 
The segregation and virtual exclusion of Afghan girls from camp schools 
occurred for several reasons, including scarcity of educational resources and the influence 
of fundamentalist mullahs. Perhaps the most significant factor, however, was the 
increased severity of purdah that occurred in the camps. As traditionally isolated village 
families found themselves crowded with strangers on foreign property, purdah became 
one of the few remaining symbols of honor and control. Accordingly, the seclusion of 
women from society became more extreme.81 The sudden exclusion of girls and women 
from education marked a drastic change from pre-1978 Afghanistan, when girls 
(primarily in more urban areas) "had taken education for granted and looked forward to a 
variety of career opportunities."82 The young boys who grew up to become Taliban were 
raised with this unusually harsh perspective on women and gender relations—a 
perspective conducive to that of the rural Durrani mullahs who initiated the Taliban 
movement. 
The camp madrasas were the scene of the most unusual ideological influence on 
the young Taliban: the blending of fundamentalist Saudi Wahhabism with Pakistani 
Deobandism, an unlikely merger that has occurred nowhere else. Wahhibis have a strong 
disdain for Sufism, which has always been tolerated by the Deoband school. In addition, 
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as previously discussed, Sufism is a popular component of traditional Islam in 
Afghanistan. In spite of the mutual animosity between Afghans and Wahhabis, numerous 
madrasas in the camps were sponsored by Saudi Arabia, which sought to "enlighten the 
ignorant Afghans" and eliminate the "un-Islamic customs and traditions that have found 
their way into their lives."83 
After Pakistan split from India in 1947, Deobandism there took several different 
incarnations, some of which no longer resembled the original anti-colonial, reformist 
Deobandism that had been influential in Afghanistan for at least a century. The history of 
Deobandism in Pakistan is too long to relate here, but of particular significance is the 
Jam'iyat-ul-'Ulama-i-Islam   (JUI),   a   contemporary   fundamentalist   derivative   of 
Deobandism.    The JUI operated in opposition to Pakistani Islamist groups such as 
Maududi's Jama'at-i-Islami, which was used by the ISI to distribute aid to Pakistan's 
preferred Islamist Mujahidin factions during the anti-Soviet conflict. The JUI program of 
Deobandism was  deeply fundamentalist,  socially progressive,  anti-imperialist,  and 
specifically anti-American. Excluded from the war effort by Zia al-Haq and the Pakistani 
Islamists, the JUI focused its efforts on establishing madrasas along the Afghan-Pakistani 
border and in the refugee camps. Their instruction was characterized by two prominent 
ideas: deep bitterness and cynicism toward the Islamist Afghan Mujahidin and their 
Pakistani benefactors, and the influence of Pashtunwali.*4 The nature of the relationship 
between the JUI and the Saudi Wahhabis during the war remains unclear. Perhaps their 
mutual fundamentalism overshadowed their ideological differences and allowed them to 
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cooperate; or perhaps they functioned separately, but their teachings were so prevalent 
that they became synonymous.   In any case, their combined ideologies resulted in a 
unique neofundamentalism characterized by distrust of Islamists, anti-modernism, and 
indifference—if not disdain—for traditional Afghan religion. 
Finally, all of these sociological problems—poor education, gender segregation, 
and extreme religious indoctrination—occurred in the culturally and psychologically 
destabilizing context of war.   Nancy Hatch Dupree describes the fundamental cultural 
dilemma of the refugee condition: 
To the burdens of idleness and dependency come the problems of 
maintaining the central elements of their culture and moral system and to 
transfer them to the young generation. Most of the young children . . . 
have never seen the Afghanistan of which their elders speak with such 
longing . . . Together with the very limited possibilities of secondary 
education and vocational training, tendencies toward a weakening of the 
traditional Afghan values of honesty, independence, industry, and 
'soberness', are the most negative prospects for the future of the Pashtun 
culture, and of Afghanistan, since they affect the young generation most 
seriously.85 
The Taliban are living evidence of the extent to which the Afghan social fabric 
was frayed by the years of warfare and exile. The plight of Afghanistan's children— 
orphaned victims of landmines and deadly toys booby-trapped by the Soviets—has been 
well publicized. Part of the Taliban psychology undoubtedly has been shaped by then- 
relentless exposure to violence. Rashid interviewed a UNICEF representative who 
conducted a survey of Kabul's children. UNICEF discovered that most children had 
witnessed extreme violence and did not expect to survive. "Two-thirds of the children 
interviewed had seen somebody killed by a rocket and scattered corpses or body parts ... 
Every norm of family life had been destroyed in the war.  When children cease to trust 
85
 Dupree, p. 231. 
41 
their parents or parents cannot provide security, children have no anchor in the real 
world."86 
As children of such violence, many of the Taliban and others of their generation 
were likely traumatized or desensitized to violence. Indeed, the most dangerous 
movements are often comprised of war orphans, who are alienated, unsocialized, and as a 
result, exceptionally brutal. Cambodia's Khmer Rouge and Sierra Leone's Revolutionary 
United Front are good examples.87 With their ongoing civil war/jihad and penchant for 
bloody punishment, the Taliban are perhaps engaging in the only political behavior 
they've ever known. 
Though avowedly Islamic (and perceived as such by the West), the Taliban's 
ideology and practices have less basis in Afghan traditional Islam or political Islamism 
than they do in Pashtunwali and the legacy of constant warfare. "The Taliban embody a 
lethal combination: a primitive tribal creed, a fierce religious ideology, and the sheer 
incompetence, naivete, and cruelty that are begot by isolation from the outside world and 
growing up amid war without parents."88 In spite of their ideological incongruity with 
traditional Afghan culture, the Taliban found—at least initially—a sufficiently receptive 
audience for their agenda. In a context of complete social breakdown and lawlessness, 
the Taliban's promise of order and security was more appealing to Afghans than their 
severe fundamentalism was offensive. 
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III. ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
As the previous chapters contend, the Taliban phenomenon is an aberrant and 
unlikely outgrowth of Afghan Islamic culture. Absent the destabilizing context of 
warfare, exile, and foreign indoctrination, it is difficult to imagine such an ideology 
emerging sui generis from Afghan tradition. Despite the frequently expressed concerns 
of Central Asian political leaders, Taliban-style ideology is even less likely to find a 
substantial receptive audience in the Central Asian republics, where religion and politics 
are both comparatively secular. 
This chapter demonstrates the incompatibility between Central Asian Islamic 
culture and Taliban-style neofundamentalism. In many ways, the basic attributes of 
Central Asia's moderate religious heritage mirror those of traditional Afghanistan. Most 
Central Asians, for example, are Sunnis adhering to the Hanafi juridical sect. As in 
Afghanistan, varied tribal groups, traditions, and languages dispersed over a wide 
geographic area have contributed to a localized and nonhierarchical religious tradition. 
Second, Indo-Persian influences, most notably in the forms of Naqshbandiyya Sufism 
and Deobandism, have been long integrated into the Sunni tribal traditions of Central 
Asia. (The Naqshbandiyya order in fact originated in the historic cities of Bukhara and 
Samarkand in modern-day Uzbekistan.) Finally, Central Asian Islam has functioned in 
parallel patterns similar to those in Afghanistan; the official Islam of the educated ulama 
coexisted with local tribal variants, and traditional Islam coexisted with modem 
politicized movements. 
In spite of these broad historical and cultural similarities, however, Central Asian 
Islamic   culture  evolved  over  time  into   something  quite  different   from  that  of 
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Afghanistan. The dispositive intervening variable, of course, was Russian and Soviet 
imperialism, which accomplished in Central Asia what it never could in Afghanistan— 
conquest and virtual assimilation. The first sections of this chapter examine the two key 
tenets of the "sovietization" process: secularization and nationalization, which drastically 
altered the scheme of religion and politics in Central Asia. Secularization diminished 
Islam's potency as a universal spiritual and ideological force, and the systematic 
nationalities policy reinforced secularization by strategically dividing Central Asia into 
artificial ethnic and national identities. The last section evaluates contemporary Central 
Asian Islam in relation to the Taliban's neofundamentalism. Though sovietization 
largely succeeded in secularizing Islamic culture, both political Islam and 
fundamentalism are present in Central Asia. Neither of these movements, however, are 
likely conduits for Taliban ideology. 
A.   THE SECULARIZATION OF ISLAM 
The contemporary form and substance of Islam in Central Asia cannot adequately 
be assessed without comprehending the legacy of the Soviet period. Russia's gradual 
advance into Central Asia began with Ivan the Terrible in 1552 and continued through the 
late nineteenth century, when the Russians consolidated their suzerainty over the entire 
region as part of their "Great Game" with Great Britain. Prior to the collapse of the 
tsarist empire, however, little attempt was made to alter fundamentally the social and 
political structures of Central Asia. 
More than any other Russian imperial territories, [Central Asia] resembled 
right up to 1917 a colony of the normal European type ... Its native 
peoples were classified as inorodtsy (aliens) and no attempt was made to 
Russify or convert them to Christianity. Their elites, unlike those of the 
Caucasus, were not incorporated into the Russian nobility, though they 
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were allowed to continue exercising most of their pre-existing powers 
under a Russian military Governor-General. The Islamic law courts were 
left undisturbed to exercise their prerogatives, at least in local affairs. 
These policies changed drastically after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Islam, 
like other religions, was anathema to the staunch atheism of the Bolsheviks' materialist 
ideology. Deplored as the "opium of the masses," religion was a first-tier public enemy 
in the socialist struggle. Accordingly, "the Soviet regime had no alternative but to 
suppress all [religious] manifestations and institutions that had been formed during the 
period of capitalism and the exploitation of man by man, the vestiges of which the 
Bolsheviks were committed to destroying as they set about constructing socialism." 
When applied to Islam in Central Asia, this general policy became all the more 
exigent. The Bolsheviks perceived Islam not only as a theoretical Marxist problem, but 
also as a tangible threat to the territorial integrity of their new southern empire. Pan- 
Islamism, prevalent throughout the Muslim world in the early twentieth century, seemed 
capable of uniting otherwise diverse Central Asian tribal groups against Russian 
dominance. As a new. unconsolidated regime embroiled in a civil war for control of the 
Russian empire, the Bolsheviks would have been hard pressed to contain a massive 
Muslim revolt. For reasons both ideological and strategic, then, secularization was an 
essential prerequisite for "mobilization of the Muslim 'toiling masses' and the creation of 
a new Soviet man" in Central Asia. 
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In the tumultuous early years of Bolshevik dominance, the Soviet central 
government treated Central Asian Islam with cautious appeasement. During this time, 
Central Asian communists led by the Tatar Sultan Galiev sought to reconcile communism 
with Islam. As advisor to Lenin and Stalin on the Muslim areas in the Narkomnats 
(Commissariat for Nationality Affairs), Galiev cautioned against an abrupt eradication of 
Islam. He advocated instead the retention of a gradually secularized form of Islam, 
which could be preserved as an instrument of social progress. Stalin's tolerance for Islam 
expired, however, when Galiev and his followers began agitating for a separate Muslim 
communist party that would be more sensitive to local cultural conditions. Galiev was 
arrested for "nationalist deviation" in 1923 and disappeared during the violent Stalinist 
purges of the 1930s.92 This bloody episode in Russian history coincided with the first 
Soviet campaign against Islam in Central Asia. 
Between the late 1920s and 1940, Stalin launched a direct attack on Islamic 
institutions and customs. This new offensive was designed to fight against "Oriental" 
societies in the Soviet Union and punish "crimes constituting survivals from the past."93 
The Muslim clergy was heavily persecuted; thousands of mullahs were executed or sent 
to gulags. Mosques were shut down in vast numbers. In 1917, there were an estimated 
26,000 mosques in Central Asia. By 1940 only 1,312 remained. (In 1985 there were 
only about 400 active mosques throughout the Central Asian Soviet Republics.)94 In 
Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), pp. 30-31. As observed by Rashid, Sultan Galiev's ideas remain salient today. First, Galiev's 
attempt to reconcile communism with Islamic tradition offered an opportunity for greater unity between 
Central Asia and Russia, which could have positively altered the twentieth century history of the region. 
Second, the post-communist nomenklatura of contemporary Central Asia now face Islamic revivals in their 
respective republics. Karimov and other secular leaders would do well to take a cue from Galiev's political 
sensitivity and penchant for ideological synthesis. 
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addition, wagf property was confiscated by the state, madrasas and sharia courts were 
closed, and anti-Islamic propaganda increased dramatically. In accordance with the 
tenets of Stalinist historiography, the Russian conquest of Central Asia was rewritten as a 
triumph of socialist revolution over tribal tyranny and backward, oppressive religious 
traditions. To maximize its influence, this history was distributed not only in Russian but 
also in various indigenous languages. 
A central cultural component of this campaign was the hujum, or 'assault,' that 
was launched for the emancipation of women. Following Kemalist Turkey, the Soviet 
government implemented forced unveiling in 1927. More radically, the Soviets made 
substantial efforts to bring women out of purdah and into the labor force and the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The long-term impact of the hujum was 
mixed; women indeed comprised a greater portion of the labor market and party 
apparatus than they otherwise would have, but many tribal and Islamic customs remained 
quietly in place.96 Most important for this study, though, are the implications of the 
Soviet hujum program vis-ä-vis Taliban policies toward Afghan women. The scaling 
back of purdah and active participation of women in public life stand in sharp contrast to 
the tenets of Afghan Pashtunwali and Taliban sharia discussed in Chapter II. Central 
Asia's communist legacy therefore includes a relatively egalitarian notion of gender roles 
that is inimical not only to Taliban ideology, but most likely to any Islamic 
fundamentalist creed as well. 
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As Yaacov Ro'i observes, the Islam that remained in Central Asia after the anti- 
religious campaign of the late 1920s through the 1930s was greatly subdued. 
Islam seemed no match for the combination of brutality and sophistication 
that characterized the regime's anti-religious policy. Religious worship 
and the fulfillment of religious rites virtually disappeared.97 
In the 1940s, the central government changed tack in its handling of Islam in the 
Soviet Union. Having greatly suppressed its institutions and praxis, Stalin now sought to 
reshape and control an "official" state version of Islam. His establishment of four 
spiritual leaderships for the totality of Soviet Muslims echoed the earlier Russian policies 
of Catherine the Great and Nicholas I, who created imperial muftiyyas to regulate and 
"functionarize" the Muslim clergy. The new spiritual leaderships performed two 
strategic functions for the Soviet government: they continued the ongoing process of 
secularization by incorporating the clergy into the state, and fractured pan-Islamism 
through strict compartmentalization of religious authority. 
Continued secularization was assured by the appointment of conservative mullahs 
who preached a relatively "harmless" Islam in concert with Soviet policies and 
objectives. The spiritual directorates fulfilled instructions from Moscow, sharply 
curtailed access to religious education, and painstakingly devised a limited practice of 
Islam that was compatible with Soviet ideology.98 Ro'i provides a typical example of the 
official state clergy in action: in 1948, fatwas were issued with the intent of preventing 
material damage that might occur to the economy as a consequence of Muslim ritual. 
These decrees "forbade absence from work on religious festivals, explained that . . . 
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certain categories of people were exempt from fasting on Ramadan, including people 
engaged in hard work, and that payment of the fitr (or zakai), had lost all significance 
under conditions of socialism, which had liquidated poverty and need." 
While the policies of the Soviet muftiyyas diluted the substance of Islam, their 
administrative structure was designed to handicap pan-Islamist unity. Division of the 
directorates into separate administrative entities precluded religious discourse on two 
levels: internally among Soviet Muslim regions, and externally between the Soviet 
Muslim community as a whole and the rest of the Muslim world. Central Asia's 
directorate, the Central Asian Spiritual Directorate of Muslims (SADUM), functioned as 
the sole authorized intermediary between the other Soviet Muslim directorates and the 
external Muslim world. Consequently, Tatars were effectively isolated from Central 
Asian Turks, Azeri Shia were cut off from Iranian influence, and the Soviet umma as a 
whole operated in virtual isolation from the rest of Islamic culture and society. 
As much as the muftiyya system controlled Islamic expression, its influence never 
fully penetrated all levels of Central Asian society. Two more major offensives against 
Islam followed Stalin's original campaign—one under Khrushchev in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, and a final crackdown under Gorbachev in 1986. Of the two, Khrushchev 
dealt the heavier blow: 25 percent of the remaining mosques were forced to close 
between 1958 and 1964. Most of these were located in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where 
Islam was most consolidated in Central Asia.101 Today, the state muftiyya concept 
remains in place, though the independent Central Asian republics have instituted their 
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own directorates, closely modeling Turkey's Directorate of Spiritual Affairs (the dyanei). 
Although Islamic culture is resurfacing gradually in Central Asia, and the various Central 
Asian political leaders endeavor to associate themselves with Islamic symbols, the 
muftiyyas are still tightly controlled. Consequently there is no supranational 
manifestation of Islam among the former Soviet Republics of Central Asia. Islam is 
attached officially to each state government and is compartmentalized institutionally 
within state borders; it does not therefore represent an independent, transnational political 
force. 
B.   THE SOVIETIZATION OF CENTRAL ASIAN IDENTITY 
As with secularization, the related nationalities policy fulfilled objectives that 
were simultaneously ideological and strategic. While seeking ostensibly to mobilize the 
"Muslim masses" and create a fusion of revolutionary, Russian-speaking, Soviet 
republics in Central Asia, the Bolsheviks also sought to break up large solidarity blocks 
such as pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism, which might challenge the emerging Soviet 
empire. Stalin's approach to both objectives was to create new ethnicities and 
corresponding nationalities within the previously undemarcated expanse of Central Asia. 
At the time, this hasty conjuring of artificial nationalisms was intended only to speed up 
the Marxist social evolution and solve geostrategic problems; Stalin could not have 
foreseen that the products of his improvised social engineering would ultimately outlive 
the greater Soviet Union itself. 
Until Stalin, Central Asia had never known the concept of creating a state by 
correlating a particular territory with an ethnic or linguistic group. The entire region was 
essentially one geographical and historical entity built on loyalty to dynasties and fidelity 
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to Islam. As explained by Naby, Central Asian identity was associated with tribe, clan, 
or religion, with a sedentary or pastoral lifestyle, but not typically with a distinct ethnicity 
or nationality. Individuals or solidarity groups understood themselves to be politically 
affiliated with one of the various Central Asian khanates, but such affiliation was not 
necessarily characterized by territorial borders, language, or any distinguishing 
characteristic that contemporary Westerners might understand as ethnic or nationalistic. 
In many areas, populations were and remain so intermixed and bilingual that "two 
brothers born of the same parents in the same location can be different ethnically today: 
one can be Uzbek and the other Tajik."102 
Central Asian identity, then, was generally Islamic, clan-based, and broadly 
Turkic-Persian; socioeconomic existence was nomadic or sedentary (but pre-industrial 
and predominantly rural in either case); and political structure was tribal and dynastic. 
These facts of Central Asian identity and politics were doubly problematic for the 
Bolsheviks as they sought to instill Marxist ideology and socialist structure. First, these 
characteristics underscored the reality that Central Asia was (according to Marxist 
theory) a pre-capitalist society that had yet to reach the ideal developmental stage for 
proletarian revolution. The Bolsheviks thus were confronted with a serious lack of 
indigenous revolutionary cadres. Communist-Muslim Tatars, such as Sultan Galiev, 
lobbied eagerly to assume these much-needed leadership roles. Practical as this solution 
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might have been, the Russians were unwilling to extend Tatar influence into Central 
Asia.103 
As Central Asian resistance against the Bolsheviks increased, Lenin sought to 
indigenize the "revolution" as quickly as possible. Between 1918 and 1920, Moscow 
announced the formation of various Central Asian republics, all of which were 
autonomous but attached to the Russian Federal Socialist Republic. In practice, this 
initial process amounted merely to changing the names of administrative territories and 
principalities that had been established under the tsars. (These pre-Soviet structures had 
likewise been based on indigenous khanates. In effect, the basic Central Asian political 
structures had not been altered under either the tsars or the early Bolsheviks.) 
Simultaneously, the Bureau of Muslim Organizations in Turkestan, which had been 
created in hopes of rallying Muslims around a communist structure of their own, was 
officially absorbed into the CPSU.104 Finally, young indigenous Muslims were 
promoted into the party system and Soviet bureaucracies. In structure, if not substance, 
the socialist revolution had been superimposed onto Central Asia by the mid-1920s. 
Assimilating the former khanates into the emerging Soviet structure did not, 
however, solve Moscow's second problem: the threat of united Central Asian resistance 
against the Soviet center, or even worse, a pan-Islamic front including Central Asia, the 
Caucasus, and the Russian Tatars. In spite of Lenin's warnings to the contrary, Stalin 
sought to break traditional Turkic and Islamic bonds once and for all through the strategic 
The Tatars played an ambiguous role in Russia and the surrounding region. They saw themselves as the 
vanguards of the Muslim community, which led them frequently to negotiate with the Russians for 
positions as privileged intermediaries. Consequently, the Tatars were seen as Russians by Central Asian 
Muslims, and as Muslims by Russians. They were not completely trusted by either party. (See Roy, The 
New Central Asia, p. 57.) 
104
 Mehrdad Haghayeghi, Islam and Politics in Central Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp 170- 
171. 
52 
demarcation of Central Asian nation-states.105 These new states would not follow 
traditional patterns; instead they deliberately would break up khanates and tribes. Given 
its purely realpolitik intent, Stalin's nationalities project was not easily reconciled with 
the ideological precepts of Marxist-Leninism. If Marx and Lenin abhorred colonial 
imperialism and extolled national self-determination, how could the Soviet Union 
externally impose statehood on essentially colonial territories? Furthermore, without an 
indigenous proletariat or bourgeois intelligentsia, how could a loose confederation of 
tribal khanates "determine" themselves to be socialist republics? 
Stalin previously had addressed these concerns in his 1913 treatise, Marxism and 
the Nationalist Question, which provided the theoretical foundation for his Central Asian 
nationalities policy in 1924. Stalin's views on nationalism and ethnicity offered a basic 
justification for the external imposition of nation-state structures, as well as the criteria 
for distinguishing one ethnic group (nationality) from another. The nationalities policy 
was grounded in the Marxist stages of socioeconomic development: tribal, slave, feudal, 
capitalist, socialist, communist. If capitalism is a prerequisite for socialist evolution, and 
the nation-state is a unique and defining feature of the "capitalist epoch," then 
expeditious conversion of pre-industrial, tribal societies to modern nations is essential. 
Since socialist revolution necessarily follows capitalism, this external manipulation 
simply hastens an inevitable and ultimately beneficial outcome. 
Thus dispensing with the "self-determination" issue, Stalin outlined criteria for 
the demarcation of separate states within Central Asia. In reality, of course, borders were 
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carved according to the basic "divide-and-rule" stratagem, but Stalin's own writings 
necessitated an ostensibly more material and historically-grounded rationale. In Marxism 
and the National Question, Stalin defined an ethnic nationality as "an historically 
constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, 
territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture."107 
Given these criteria for nationality, cadres of Soviet linguists, historians, and other 
academics received the dubious task of "discovering" distinct ethnic groups that 
corresponded to the meandering state boundaries drawn by Stalin. While this process 
was relatively easy in the Caucasus, where groups such as Georgians and Armenians 
always did possess a sense of nation—ethnically and territorially, the same could not be 
said for Uzbeks or Tajiks. 
Thus languages were invented as the occasion demanded: since it had 
been decided that there was a Tajik ethnic group, there would have to be 
an accompanying language—Tajik—since an ethnic group was defined by 
the fact of its having a language. In another example, Chaghatay was 
defined as Old Uzbek even though there were no Uzbeks among the 
populations that spoke Chaghatay before the sixteenth century . . . The 
nature of the process thus becomes clear: the ethnic group in question is 
not first defined by scientific analysis and then given administrative status. 
On the contrary, first it gets its status, and then it is up to the experts to 
find it a. post facto scientific foundation.108 
Though language was the centerpiece of the nationalities policy, the same sort of 
revisionist science was applied in other fields such as history and economics. The result 
was a new map of "historically constituted" nations, each of which maintained two 
official languages: an indigenous national language109 and Russian, the latter of which 
ges were 
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gradually became the lingua franca of the Central Asian republics. The alphabet in all 
the new Central Asian Soviet republics was changed from Arabic to Latin and then 
permanently to Cyrillic. These alphabetic changes alone had enormous impact on 
Islamic culture, cutting Soviet Muslims off from their own religious heritage, the heritage 
of the whole Islamic world, and contemporary Islamist movements that operated outside 
the Soviet Union.110 The communist educational system replaced traditional madrasas. 
The Soviets blended regional culture with Soviet culture, using local history, languages, 
epics, folklore, and arts to carry the socialist message. The state confiscated land and 
organized the state populations into collectives, or kolkhoz, which essentially reproduced 
the soviet structure at the local level. The Central Asian political economy is discussed in 
greater detail in Chapter IV, but the kolkhoz system also had social implications that are 
important here. 
The kolkhoz was more than just a unit of production; it was a socioeconomic 
community. As such, it functioned in much the same way as tribes and informal 
networks had always functioned in Central Asian society. The kolkhoz "took care of 
work, administrative identity, social welfare, public works (irrigation, etc.)." The key 
difference, of course, was that the kolkhoz substituted communism for Islam as its 
unifying ideology and source of authority. The kolkhoz system thus became an effective 
tool for secularization and nationalization; it penetrated society effectively because it so 
closely resembled traditional social structures. Likewise, because the kolkhoz blended so 
110
 Sergei A. Panarin, "The Ethnohistorical Dynamics of Muslim Societies within Russia and the CIS," in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus after the Soviet Union, ed. Mohiaddin Mesbahi (Tallahassee: University 
Press of Florida, 1994), p. 26. 
111
 Roy, The New Central Asia, p. 88. 
55 
effectively into traditional society, it contributed greatly to the overall process of 
sovietization. 
On balance, Stalin's attempt to elevate a manufactured ethnic nationalism above 
Islam was effective.   The strategic division of territory broke up tribal and religious 
solidarity groups, created economic dependence on the central Soviet government, and 
greatly reduced the ideological strength of religion. The greatest testament to Stalin's 
success is the fact that the Central Asian republics, with their secular governments and 
intertwining borders, have outlasted the Soviet Union itself. The Soviet intent, of course, 
was not to create viable, autonomous nation-states, but simply to break pre-Soviet social 
bonds and reduce Central Asia to an administrative template more conducive to eventual 
fusion into the Soviet whole.   As Roy suggests, however, the systematic process of 
sovietization resulted in satellite republics that were better equipped for independent 
nationhood than Russia itself ever was.112 
C.   POPULAR AND POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
While a local, traditional practice of Islam quietly persisted throughout the Soviet 
era, politicized and fundamentalist movements have reappeared openly for the first time 
since the early Bolshevik period. None of these three variants, however— 
popular/traditional, Islamist, or fundamentalist—are likely to channel Taliban-style 
ideology into Central Asian discourse. The most common expression of Islam by far in 
contemporary society is the popular tradition, which over time has lost much of its 
spiritual or ideological context; what remains is a ritualized, familial tradition that 
signifies culture and identity more than faith or ideology.   Modern political Islam in 
Roy, The New Central Asia. 
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Central Asia resembles older movements that opposed Russian imperialism and Soviet 
communism. Like their nineteenth century predecessors, the post-Soviet Islamists are 
typically educated and willing to work within the prevailing political system. 
Fundamentalist movements are the most radical political element in the Central Asian 
republics. Unlike political Islamists or mainstream "traditionalists," they do interact 
significantly with Afghanistan's Taliban regime. These groups have very little following, 
though, and their connection to the Taliban is more a matter of expediency than 
ideological conformity. 
Despite 70 years of secular Soviet domination, Central Asians have managed to 
retain vestiges of their Islamic heritage. Religious institutions have reopened in 
substantial numbers, dormant traditions are reawakening, and hollow Islamic conventions 
are regaining spiritual and cultural substance. The extent and character of this "Islamic 
renaissance" is not yet clear. The impact of the Soviet period undoubtedly has been 
profound, and Islam is but one variable—albeit an important one—in a larger Central 
Asian transformation involving identity, politics, and economics. Not only is the role of 
religion evolving in Central Asia, but it is doing so in a politically closed atmosphere. 
Consequently, reliable studies of popular religiosity in the region are lacking. Available 
analyses are quickly outdated, and are more often anecdotal rather than empirical. Any 
scholar attempting a survey of religious proclivity in Central Asia is challenged by the 
difficulties of obtaining truly representative samples and—given the oppressive political 
climate—of eliciting uninhibited responses. 
These caveats notwithstanding, it is reasonable to conclude that, for the majority 
of Central Asia's citizens, the recent Islamic revival is more a matter of culture and 
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identity than faith or political ideology.   Several factors contribute to this relatively 
secular notion of religion. First, Islam came late to much of Central Asia and never fully 
took hold in the vast expanses of Kazakhstan and parts of Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan. 
While the more sedentary cultures of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and southern Turkmenistan 
became major Islamic centers as early as the ninth century, the nomadic populations of 
the northern steppes were not converted in substantial numbers until at least the fifteenth 
century.    Even then, Islam never fully permeated tribal structures and shamanistic 
traditions.   Ironically, the efforts of Sufi missionaries contributed to the persistence of 
shamanism as both traditions inter-penetrated each other over the years.113 As Mehrdad 
Haghayeghi explains: 
The combination of Islam's relatively late entry into the Kazakh Steppe, 
the Kyrgyz mountains, and the Turkmen grasslands and the survival of the 
tribal social structures have produced an Islamic landscape with mild 
ideological colorings that have continued to survive until today . . . within 
each of the five republics there exists considerable regional diversity, 
which has so far been an obstacle to the wholesale radicalization of Islam 
in the region.114 
Second, the Soviet policies discussed in the previous sections of this chapter have 
consolidated the relative secularism of the north while diluting the deeper religiosity of 
the south.    After decades and generations of secular education, propaganda, and 
government, Central Asian Islamic practices have been divested of much of their spiritual 
meaning. Current social trends suggest that the Islamic renaissance therefore represents a 
Central Asian assertion of a  cultural identity independent of Russia  and  Soviet 
communism. In 1994, Nancy Lubin conducted a survey of religious and ethnic attitudes 
in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.   She concluded that personal understanding of Islamic 
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doctrine in Central Asia remains limited or distorted, and that few respondents in either 
country hoped for an Islamic state. Fewer than half (46 percent) of those surveyed in 
Uzbekistan and only one quarter of participating Kazakhs identified themselves as 
"believers" who practiced Islam. In Uzbekistan, where Islam is most deeply ingrained, 
Islamic belief appeared weakest among the younger population; only 39 percent of 18- 
29-year olds saw themselves as Muslims. If accurate, this observation does not suggest a 
popular embrace of political Islam, which typically is supported by younger 
generations.115 Much of the middle class—another definitive element of Islamism— 
remains adamantly opposed to Islamist ideology. While it may support secular 
democratic alternatives to the current regimes, the middle class majority "holds firmly to 
the belief propagated during Soviet times that Islam is dangerous, backward, and 
repressive."116 
Many observers note the resurgence of Islamic practices and rituals. Rites of 
passage such as circumcision, marriage, and burial are routinely practiced throughout 
Central Asia according to Islamic tradition. As Haghayeghi notes, however, these types 
of observances are in essence the most marginal and least time-consuming aspects of 
Islamic practice.117 Lubin's study supports Haghayeghi's suggestion that more regular 
and disruptive practices such as praying five times per day, mosque attendance, and 
fasting occur less frequently and among relatively few members of the population. 
There has not been a substantial conversion to Islamic dress.   In Central Asian cities, 
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most residents dress in Western clothing, and women do not generally cover their hair.119 
All in all, Islamic practices are very much alive, but in a watered-down and contradictory 
form.   As Roy observes, many Central Asians don't eat pork, but they drink plenty of 
vodka.120 
Finally, traditional submissiveness to authority and preference for order and 
stability work against the spread of radical Islamic ideologies. Many Uzbeks, for 
example, support President Karimov despite his oppressive tactics, and insist that 
Uzbekistan's problems are due to "corrupt bureaucrats" that surround him.121 According 
to Lubin's survey, Central Asians in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan cited the maintenance of 
order and stability in the wake of post-Soviet economic and political turmoil as their most 
important concern. Given this concern for order, Uzbek support in the survey for 
Karimov is less surprising. Even the few respondents who claimed to favor an Islamic 
state named Karimov as their most respected leader, giving comparatively low marks to 
the Muslim clergy. As Lubin cautions, however, concern about providing the politically 
correct answer undoubtedly influenced the answers of at least some respondents.122 
In addition to the factors of historically weak and diffuse Islamic traditions, 
Soviet secularization, and deference to status quo authority, Ahmed Rashid cites ethnic 
rivalries, high literacy levels, continuing Slavic and now Western cultural influences, and 
the chaotic examples of Afghanistan and Tajikistan as factors that militate against 
popular acceptance of political or fundamentalist Islam. The Taliban have set an example 
As Chapter IV demonstrates, avoidance of Islamic dress, particularly in Uzbekistan in the latter 1990s, 
is due at least in part to government persecution of anyone appearing "too Islamic." 
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that is horrifying to most Central Asians.123 Despite this general ambivalence toward 
religion in Central Asia, Islamic opposition movements do exist. These groups, however, 
do not currently attract a significant amount of popular support. Furthermore, they are 
firmly rooted in Central Asian history and contemporary circumstances, and do not 
represent an influx of Taliban ideology. 
As in Muslim colonial situations the world over, Russian imperialism in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus stimulated a current of Muslim intellectual responses. Foremost 
among these new movements was the usul-ijadid, or "new method," which had its origin 
among wealthy and educated Tatars, whose experiences with Russian culture made them 
sensitive to their own heritage and comparative backwardness. The most famous jadid 
leader was Isma'il Gasprinskii (1851-1914), a European-educated Crimean Tatar who 
sought to rid Islam of its archaic aspects and modernize it through education and sciences 
borrowed from the West. In this respect, the jadid movement resembled 
contemporaneous Islamic reform movements that swept the Islamic world during the 
salafiyya of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The jadid movement's greatest source of appeal was also its ultimate weakness: 
unlike the pan-Islamism of the Young Ottomans, which advocated modernization through 
strict adherence to purified Islamic principles; and unlike the subsequent Young Turks, 
who espoused a secular Turkish nationalism, the jadid assimilated both contradictory 
viewpoints into their agenda. This inclusive ideology allowed the jadid movement 
initially to function as the hub of otherwise disparate opposition groups, ranging from 
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Sultan Galiev's Muslim Communists to the tribal fundamentalists of the basmachis. 
Unfortunately, the inherent tension within the jadid between pan-Islamic reform and pan- 
Turkic secularism erupted after the Bolshevik Revolution, when some jadid-allied 
opposition groups sided with the Whites, others joined the Bolsheviks, and still others 
resisted all Russian factions. The jadid themselves vacillated between resistance to the 
Bolsheviks and alliance with them.125 
Throughout most of the Soviet period, political Islam disappeared from public 
view. Under Brezhnev in the late 1960s, theology students were permitted to study 
abroad in places such as Egypt and Jordan. An unintended consequence of this policy 
was that students returned deeply influenced by the Islamist thinking of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. An Islamist undercurrent generated momentum in the Soviet Muslim 
community during the anti-Islamic crackdown of the mid-1980s, and then found its first 
public expression during Gorbachev's subsequent policies of glasnost and perestroika}26 
In 1989, the new policy of "openness" toward religion was made manifest in the opening 
of numerous mosques, shrines, and madrasas throughout Soviet Muslim regions.127 
By 1990, the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) had emerged as the dominant 
expression of political Islam in Central Asia. Headquartered in Moscow, the party 
established branches in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Several factors have limited the IRP's 
appeal to Central Asians at large and underscored its ideological incompatibility with the 
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Taliban. First, like their jadid forefathers, IRP leaders were predominantly of Tatar 
origin and favored a limited Islamic revival within a preserved Soviet structure. This 
caused a rupture between the party's central leadership and its branches in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus. Second, the Central Asian IRP's pan-Islamist/pan-Turkic agenda also 
mirrored that of the jadid; in the post-Soviet order of the 1990s, however, such 
sentiments ran counter to the prevailing nationalisms that had taken root in the former 
Soviet republics. The failure of pan-Islamist ideas to captivate a sizeable audience in 
Central Asia accentuates the long-term impact of Stalin's secularization and nationalities 
policies. Finally, the IRP has fractured along national, ethnic, and ideological lines. 
Some factions are closely connected to official state clergies while others remain isolated 
and opposed to the secular states and their muftiyyas.m The coalition government in 
Tajikistan, formed in the wake of the bloody Tajik civil war, is a good example of how 
political Islam has been "de-Islamicized." After supporting the fundamentalist Islamic 
Movement of Tajikistan in a violent campaign against the secular government during the 
war, the Tajik IRP now works legitimately within the government framework, and 
espouses a line that is more nationalistic and democratic than Islamist. 
The vast differences between Central Asian political Islam and the Taliban are 
readily apparent. The Central Asian IRP factions have functioned as political parties that 
generally work within the prevailing political system. IRP leaders in Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan have expressed preference for parliamentary democracy and equal rights for 
ethnic and religious minorities. They have publicly disavowed any intent to replace 
secular government with Islamic government.129 The Taliban, in contrast, have advanced 
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their agenda through violence and do not perceive themselves as a political party. They 
have, in fact, banned all political parties in Afghanistan.   Additionally, Central Asian 
Islamists are not Islamic fundamentalists; they advocate Islamic revival and sharia as the 
basis of a modern political and economic system.   As evidenced by Mullah Wakil's 
statement about "recreating the time of the Prophet" (see quotation on page 7), the 
Taliban's outlook is distinctly regressive and strictly fundamentalist. A senior leader of 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia commented on the differences between his organization 
and the Taliban in an interview with Ahmed Rashid: 
Hizb-ut-Tahrir believes women must work and be educated but also wear 
the hejab [the covering of the head but not the face]. We support the 
Taliban and many Hizb-ut-Tahrir members have fled to safety in 
Afghanistan to escape the crackdown in Central Asia. The Taliban have 
some good ideas. They want a pure Islamic state. The difference between 
[them and] us is that we want a modern life here on earth, to create a 
heaven on earth and also to prepare people to go to heaven in the afterlife; 
the Taliban only want an afterlife.130 
Finally, the character and substance of Central Asian Islamism is very much a 
product of the legacy of sovietization in Central Asia. Secularization and nationalization 
may have given rise to the Islamist movement, but these same phenomena have also 
tempered it substantially. The Taliban's sociological origins are vastly different, and 
have exacerbated rather than moderated the regime's extreme religious interpretations 
and radical behavior. 
Such obvious distinctions cannot be drawn between the Taliban and Central Asian 
fundamentalists, though the latter are no more likely than Central Asian Islamists to 
spread   Taliban-style   neofundamentalism   in   the   Central   Asian   republics.      Like 
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contemporary Islamism, Central Asian fundamentalism has antecedents in the Bolshevik 
conflict of 1917. The basmachi revolt131 was a conservative, rural movement consisting 
of several Central Asian clans, primarily Uzbek, Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Turkmen. The 
basmachis were led by an assortment of local mullahs, khans, or tribal chiefs. They 
initially rose against the Bolshevik attacks and requisitions, and then against imposed 
Soviet reforms of the 1920s, which threatened local tribal structures and religious 
practices.132 The basmachis fought a decentralized guerilla war that bears comparison to 
the Afghan Mujahidin's resistance to the Soviet invasion of 1979. Like the Afghan 
Mujahidin, the basmachis' tenacity and skillful application of guerilla tactics were 
hindered by lack of coordination, clan rivalry, and limited resources. Whereas the 
modem Mujahidin were led primarily by Islamists such as Hekmatyar and Massoud, 
however, the basmachis were devout fundamentalists who opposed not only the 
Bolsheviks, but the Mamistjadid and the secular Muslim Communists as well. 
Central Asia's contemporary fundamentalist militias have much in common with 
the basmachis. Roy argues that today's rural, fundamentalist conflicts cannot be 
explained adequately without reference to the history of the basmachi period. First, 
today's fundamentalists emerged from Central Asia's Ferghana Valley, which was a 
principal basmachi stronghold. As a traditional bastion of conservative Islam, Ferghana 
was a prime target of Stalin's nationalities policy. His meandering borders are at their 
most circuitous here. As Figure 1 demonstrates, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan 
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all share a piece of the valley. While this imposition of borders has undoubtedly hindered 
the development of a broader solidarity among rural fundamentalists, it has also created 
ongoing security problems for the three republics that share it. 
Second, the basmachi revolts were at least as much about clan, territory, and 
rebellion against government despotism as they were about Islam. The Tajik civil war of 
the 1990s echoed these same themes. During the Soviet period, the displacement of rural 
clans into kolkhoz collectives created antagonisms among solidarity groups that had not 
previously competed for land. The alignment in 1992 of the Islamist IRP and 
fundamentalist clans with nationalist groups against the communist state and pro-state 
clans was incidental to the core issue, which was "competition for power and assets 
among regions in the context of economic collapse."135 
Consideration of Central Asian fundamentalism in historical perspective reveals 
that, as in the case of political Islam, contemporary fundamentalist groups emerged 
indigenously and in isolation from the Taliban. Indeed, today's fundamentalist groups 
appeared in Central Asia at least as early as 1992—several years before the Taliban 
emerged in Afghanistan. Regardless of the claims of Central Asian governments, 
fundamentalism does not therefore represent a "foreign invasion" by the Taliban or any 
other group. Ferghana Valley fundamentalism has deep roots in Central Asian history. 
Additionally, claims that the IMU is a protege of the Taliban fail to reconcile 
important contradictions. The Afghan civil war, for example, is largely an ethnic contest 
between the Pashtun Taliban and the Uzbek/Tajik Northern Alliance. How, when, and 
why did the EMU transfer its allegiance from its Uzbek and Tajik brothers in northern 
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Afghanistan to their mortal Pashtun enemies in Kabul? Even if the Taliban and the IMU 
are allied in some way, it seems unlikely that their association could be a comfortable one 
given the ethnic dynamics involved. Also, the Northern Alliance controls the border 
regions between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. How does the IMU traverse this territory in 
order to reach sanctuary in Taliban-controlled areas?136 There are currently no clear 
answers to these questions, though they nonetheless cast further doubt on the assertion of 
a paternal relationship between the Taliban and the IMU. If anything, Taliban support for 
the IMU is probably based on little more than a Machiavellian formulation—both entities 
share common enemies in the Central Asian governments that oppose them. In any case, 
regardless of whether or not the IMU shares Taliban ideology, the organization's overall 
numbers are miniscule relative to the general population of even a sub-region of 
Uzbekistan—let alone Central Asia as a whole. 
Ultimately, the Soviet legacy is perhaps no more eradicable for the new Central 
Asians than Islam proved to be for the Soviets. The emergent Islamic culture is likely to 
be the product of Central Asia's conflicting legacies; the political landscape will be de- 
secularized somewhat by Islam, but extremely conservative or radical Islamist tendencies 
will be tempered by popular adherence to secular institutions and principles. Popular 
aversion to radical opposition groups is due in no small part to the example set by the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. It would thus appear unlikely that Central Asians would be 
receptive to such an ideology in their own countries. Given the political and economic 
implications of Islamic discontent, however, Central Asia's political climate and 
economic outlook are the dispositive variables in determining the function of Islam in 
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society and politics. The following chapter evaluates Islamic opposition in the context of 
Central Asia's political economy, and considers the Taliban's role in this equation. 
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IV. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA 
This study has focused thus far on elements of social structure to explain the 
relationship between the Taliban and Islamic opposition groups in Central Asia. The 
previous chapters located the separate and distinct social origins of these political 
movements, thus dispelling any notion of one group spawning the other. Additionally, 
cultural norms and institutional constraints have undoubtedly influenced the behavior of 
actors in both Afghanistan and Central Asia. For the Taliban, these factors include the 
Pashtunwali tribal code, the alienation of life in refugee camps, the desensitizing effects 
of warfare, and unusual religious indoctrination. In Central Asia, prominent cultural 
norms and structural features include the juxtaposition of Islamic and tribal traditions 
against the imposed institutions of secularism, communist government, and constructed 
nationality. While these sociological explanations go a long way toward illustrating the 
Taliban's anomalous nature and Central Asia's comparatively secular proclivity, they 
don't explain completely the contemporary rise of Islamic opposition in Central Asia or 
the nature of these groups' relationship to the Taliban. To understand these relationships 
more fully, we must consider not only their cultural and sociological origins, but also the 
dynamic context in which they function. To this end, it is useful to examine Islamist 
opposition through the theoretical lens of political economy, which places analytical 
emphasis on rational choice and self-interest. As suggested in the first chapter, politics 
and economics offer the most compelling explanations for the rise of political Islam. 
Through analysis of Central Asia's political economy, this chapter therefore 
argues that the rise of militant Islam in Central Asia is attributable not to the infiltration 
of Taliban ideology, but rather to the endogenous politics and economic conditions of the 
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Central Asian republics themselves. The Taliban are only significant to the extent that 
their political and economic failure in Afghanistan exacerbates political and economic 
problems in Central Asia. 
The first section examines the impact of the Soviet period on Central Asia's 
contemporary political economy. As with other former Soviet republics, much of the 
region's current economic troubles and authoritarian tendencies are directly attributable 
to the Soviet legacy. The next section assesses current political and economic trends in 
the Central Asian republics. Since acquiring independence from Moscow in 1991, the 
Central Asian governments have become consolidated dictatorships. The Central Asian 
economies remain inefficient and stagnant, and the various governments have failed 
either to meet popular welfare expectations or to compensate for these failures by 
granting more political rights and freedoms to the Central Asian people. As a result, the 
most oppressed and economically disadvantaged sectors of the population have turned 
increasingly toward Islamic opposition in parts of Central Asia where religion is deeply 
embedded. Finally, this chapter considers the Central Asian political economy in the 
broader context of regional geopolitics—particularly Central Asia's exigent need to 
exploit its oil and gas resources and the international competition to control these 
resources. The Taliban's destabilizing behaviors, including narcotics distribution, 
support for international terrorism, and civil war, are important variables in Central 
Asia's quest for international credibility, consolidated sovereignty, and economic 
advancement. 
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A. THE SOVIET LEGACY 
Prior to the height of Russian imperialism in the late nineteenth century, Central 
Asia was in a state of decline and isolation. The region's thriving tripartite economy, in 
which sedentary farmers and pastoral nomads operated in synergy with caravan traders, 
was disrupted by the European discovery of sea routes to India and China. As the Silk 
Road's importance diminished, so too did Central Asia's prominence as the crossroads of 
civilization and commerce. Over the next few centuries, the region remained essentially 
pastoral and agricultural. The Central Asian political economy was similar in substance 
if not form to that of other Muslim communities to the south. Political power and 
economic resources were held exclusively by the great khans of the three main 
principalities: Bukhara, Khokand, and Khiva. In principle, all land belonged to the 
khans, who divided it into state lands, private lands (with the khan's tacit approval), land 
temporarily allocated to relatives or friends of the khan, and religious endowment land 
(waqf).   Sharecropping arrangements, exploitative taxes, and surplus expropriation left 
137 the majority of the population destitute. 
Meanwhile, the Central Asian economy as a whole grew increasingly dependent 
on trade with Russia to the north. By the turn of the twentieth century, Russia exercised 
colonial dominion over Central Asia, extracting its resources (primarily cotton) and 
selling them back in the form of finished products. By World War I, the growing Russian 
industrial base obtained 87 percent of its raw cotton from Central Asia. 2,670 miles of 
Russian-built railways traversed the region and facilitated Moscow's extraction of 
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resources. Thus, when the Bolsheviks came to power in 1917, Central Asia was 
already an indispensable economic asset of the nascent Soviet empire. Recognizing this 
reality, the Soviets set out to reconquer the region in their own right, in accordance with 
Soviet ideology and Soviet objectives. Whereas Tsarist Russia sought only to extract 
resources while leaving basic political and cultural structures intact, the Soviets embarked 
on a much more ambitious project: "the transformation of Central Asia by a supposedly 
superior Russian model, a process entailing ideological, political, and physical coercion 
and socioeconomic revolution from above."139 Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union in 1991, the legacy of the Soviet project continues to permeate every aspect of 
Central Asia's political economy. 
The sovietization of Central Asia was comprehensive in scope and totalitarian in 
intent. Chapter III explored two key tenets of this process: secularization and 
nationalization, both of which broke down traditional social structures and altered the 
nature of Islamic culture in Central Asia. This section examines the political and 
economic integration of Central Asia into the Soviet Union. 
The Bolsheviks' primary political objective in Central Asia was to capture 
political power and subordinate it to the centralized control of the communist party-state 
apparatus. This process required the breakdown of both Tsarist and indigenous political 
structures. After the Bolshevik Revolution, Tsarist colonial governors in Central Asia 
were replaced with new Soviet cadres. Secularization policies disrupted religious 
authority by closing mosques, persecuting clergy, and co-opting the ulama into the state 
Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, p. 52 
Stephen Blank, "Soviet Reconquest of Central Asia," in Central Asia: Its Strategic Importance and 
Future Prospects, ed. Hafeez Malik (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 39. 
72 
apparatus. Stalin's delineation of artificial states and corresponding ethnicities broke 
down tribal structures. After the creation of the five Central Asian Soviet republics in the 
1920s, Moscow recognized the need for indigenous leadership. Korenizatsiya 
('nativization') became the key word in dealing with the new republics. Finding capable 
and reliable native cadres proved more difficult in practice, however. Issues of loyalty 
and reliability were "accentuated by the low levels of literacy and education that 
remained until well into the 1930s, so that even in the middle ofthat decade over 90 
percent of city soviet chairmen in Uzbekistan had only a primary education." 
Consequently, Russian Slavs retained many positions of authority in administrative, 
security, and industrial sectors. Aggressive communist-oriented education greatly 
improved literacy and ideological indoctrination over the next few decades, but 
korenizatsiya was never fully implemented—Slavic Russians permeated the Central 
Asian party structure throughout the Soviet period. 
Alastair McCauley identifies several political features of the Soviet era that have 
had detrimental consequences for the post-Soviet independence of the Central Asian 
republics. First, the centralization of political authority in Moscow left the post- 
independence republics with very little executive experience. Several critical areas of 
policy-making, including economic planning and foreign policy, were all conducted from 
Moscow. Central Asian political elites were simply local apparatchiks tasked with 
enforcing a party line that was dictated to them. Second, the centralization of political 
authority was accompanied by centralization of administrative responsibility. Here again, 
the new republics and their local institutions were ill equipped to carry out the normal 
functions of government.  Finally, centralized planning and trade monopoly meant that 
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the new republics had neither the experience nor the personnel to comprehend 
international trade institutions or technical functions such as those involving foreign 
currency.141 With regard to contemporary Islamist discontent in Central Asia, however, 
one aspect of the Soviet political inheritance is perhaps the most salient: the absolute 
suppression of all political dissent. Throughout the Soviet years, the "possibility of any 
challenge to Soviet-installed power was minimized through a systematic series of purges, 
liquidations, and decapitations of potential or actual native leaders, and as a result no 
credible opposition was ever allowed to emerge."142 
The consolidation of Soviet political control enabled Moscow to employ the 
overwhelming power of the state to achieve its primary economic objectives in Central 
Asia: extraction and the promotion of total Central Asian dependency on the Soviet 
center. As discussed above, these processes were initiated under Tsarist imperialism, but 
the Soviet Union expanded economic control from colonial imperialism to virtual 
totalitarianism. Central Asian society and economy were substantially restructured from 
the bottom up. Two general policies were instrumental in this sweeping process: 
collectivization and specialization. 
Central Asia's economy was completely destroyed during the civil war between 
the Bolsheviks and the Whites, which began in early 1918. Railway blockades by the 
White army cut off trade between Russia and Central Asia; no grain and other imports 
could arrive and no cotton could be exported. By 1920, peasant farmers lost 50 percent 
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of their cultivated land, nomads lost two-thirds of their animal stock, and the population 
as a whole was greatly reduced by famine, warfare, and emigration. "The communists 
thus inherited an almost nonexistent economy, a devastated infrastructure, ruined cities 
and a population that was seething with unrest and revolt." 
In the late 1920s, after Stalin had replaced old khanates and Russian colonial 
districts with new Soviet republics, the campaign for collectivization was launched, along 
with an effort to force the sedentarization of the nomads. Coming on the heels of the 
civil war's devastation, and proceeding simultaneously with Stalin's infamous purges and 
secularization policies of the 1930s, forced collectivization compounded Central Asia's 
misery and devastation exponentially. In December 1929 Stalin ordered the liquidation 
of the kulaks (land-owning peasants) as a class. The campaign was made more brutal by 
the speed with which it was carried out; by March of 1930 10 million peasant holdings 
were brought into the collective farm system across the Soviet Union. Approximately 6.5 
million nomads, kulaks, and urban dwellers perished throughout the Soviet Union—more 
than 1 million of these were Central Asians. 
The effectiveness of collectivization was at best ambiguous. On the one hand, the 
re-grouping of Central Asia into units of production {kolkhoz) imposed legibility on the 
economy and enabled centralized planning. The kolkhoz also served, to some degree, to 
filter communist ideology and praxis down to the lowest social levels. On the other hand, 
it also allowed traditional clan and tribal structures to maintain their solidarity through a 
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reconstituted  socioeconomic  system that resembled traditional networks  in many 
respects.     In terms of actual agricultural production, collectivization was disastrous. 
Production fell in virtually every sector as peasants put up resistance, 
directly or indirectly, and as repression often carried away the most 
productive individuals in the village community . . . More importantly, 
collectivization created a legacy of bitterness which subsequent economic 
development could not overcome.146 
Despite some urban industrialization, particularly in Kazakhstan, the Soviet 
central planners preferred to utilize Central Asia as an agricultural producer. Both 
industry and agriculture were conducted autonomously in relation to Moscow's 
objectives; there was no local articulation between these sectors. Throughout the Soviet 
era, regional specialization favored cotton in Central Asia. By the 1980s, Central Asia 
produced 95 percent of the Soviet Union's cotton. Uzbekistan alone devoted 70 percent 
of its sown area to cotton. Cotton constituted 65 percent of Uzbekistan's gross economic 
output, consumed 60 percent of its resources, and employed 40 percent of its total labor 
force. 96 percent of Central Asia's raw cotton was shipped to the Russian republic and 
other Soviet republics for processing and manufacturing. Despite Central Asia's 
considerable oil and mineral deposits, these resources were substantially ignored by the 
Soviets in favor of cotton "super-specialization."148 
The consequences of collectivization and specialization have been profound in 
Central Asia. Most importantly, these policies created a legacy of dependency; the 
Central Asian republics were totally dependent on the Soviet center, while Central Asian 
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Citizens learned to depend on the social welfare state.    Despite the region's vast 
agricultural and industrial potential, central planning and cotton specialization rendered 
the Central Asian republics unable to support themselves. Foodstuffs and manufactured 
goods were all imported from other Soviet republics. Just as the Central Asian republics 
were dependent on Moscow, so were the Central Asian people dependent on the state for 
employment and social welfare.    This dual-level economic dependency adds extra 
pressure to the contemporary post-Soviet republics, which must modernize their 
economies while satisfying public welfare expectations. As Kate Schecter explains: 
The social contract between the state and workers during the Soviet era 
ensured cradle to grave security for all citizens in exchange for their 
individual freedom. This "bargain" between the state and its citizens also 
created a widespread mentality that survived the fall of communism. 
Citizens of the transition nations still expect the state to provide the basic 
necessities of life. The abrupt switch to a market economy left both 
workers and managers without the skills to survive and compete in the 
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new environment. 
Additionally, central planning and specialization distorted the economies of the 
new republics in several ways. First, the Soviet system lacked a well-developed banking 
system and other institutions necessary for the formulation and implementation of 
effective macro-economic policy. From a micro-economic perspective, central planning 
and public ownership resulted in enormous allocative inefficiency. Structural distortions 
are also apparent, not only in the disastrous cotton specialization, but also in the generally 
over-developed manufacturing and agricultural industries and the underdeveloped 
services sector.150 A final enduring consequence of Soviet economic policies in Central 
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Asia is ecological: the cotton monoculture has had a devastating impact on the 
environment. Decades of one-crop farming have ruined much of the soil, over-irrigation 
has increased water salinity, and heavy reliance on chemical fertilizers has created 
enormous health and environmental problems. As a result, Central Asia's agricultural 
capacity is now diminished and its already tenuous water supply is decreasing.151 
The post-independence Central Asian republics, then, have inherited an 
inauspicious political economy from their Soviet forefathers. When the Soviet Union 
dissolved in 1991, the new republics were led by authoritarian political leaders with little 
policymaking experience and no tolerance for political dissent. Central Asian citizens 
were acclimated to receiving state employment and basic social services in lieu of civil 
liberties and participation in political processes. The state's ability to provide these 
services depended on the Soviet center, which extracted local resources and managed all 
aspects of the local economy. In the absence of external subsidies, and with a decimated 
agricultural capability, the post-Soviet Central Asian regimes now are challenged to 
maintain their absolute political control while meeting the economic expectations of their 
respective citizenries. 
B. POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND ISLAM IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA 
Since acquiring independence in 1991, the current Central Asian governments 
have failed to reverse the political and economic trends of the Soviet period. Politics 
remain staunchly authoritarian; if anything, political oppression has become more severe 
and autocracy is further consolidated. The Central Asian economies remain stagnant and 
state-dominated. The different republics disagree on development strategies and models, 
Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, pp. 60-61. 
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but none of their various plans involve significant liberalization in the near future. This 
section examines the contemporary political economy of Central Asia, and relates these 
findings to the potential for Islamist political violence in the region. 
The Central Asian governments were completely unprepared for independence 
when it was thrust upon them in 1991. Unlike other Soviet republics or the former 
colonies of Western imperial powers, the Central Asian republics neither sought nor 
desired autonomy; on the contrary, they unanimously supported the abortive hardliners' 
coup of August 1991, which sought to preserve the Soviet Union under communist rule. 
Independence, then, did not significantly alter the existing power structures in Central 
Asia, leaving intact communist regimes whose authority is challenged by any reform of 
extant political and economic structures. Consequently, all five presidents (all of whom 
rose to prominence through the Soviet nomenklatura) have resisted pressures to 
democratize. 
Despite President Islam Karimov's claims that he presides over a democratic 
republic, Uzbekistan has developed into a consolidated autocracy since acquiring 
independence in 1991. Karimov has eliminated any challenges to his authority by 
banning opposition groups and ensuring that elections are neither free nor fair. Normal 
elements of civil society, including independent trade unions and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), are few in number and heavily restricted. Despite a constitutional 
framework for press freedom, the media is curtailed and serves primarily as a mouthpiece 
for the government. While Uzbekistan's constitution and legal code detail various 
freedoms and rights, the government demonstrates little regard for these provisions. 
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Karimov has argued since the beginning of Uzbekistan's independence 
that the stresses of the transformation to a market economy require a 
strong hand . . . Karimov has interpreted "opposition" in ever broader 
terms, so that now even a neutral absence of enthusiastic support for his 
government can be defined as illegal dissent.153 
Consequently, political opposition figures, religious groups, and ethnic minorities 
all experience discrimination and oppression.   Of these, Karimov directs most of his 
distrust, blame, and oppression at religious opposition.  Two prominent Islamic parties, 
the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and Adolat ("Justice") are banned and have never 
been allowed to register.    A September 1996 law on political parties prohibits the 
formation of parties based on religious grounds, thus sealing the fate of these and other 
Islamic-oriented opposition movements.154 (Ironically, organizations such as the IRP and 
Adolat first became active during the later Soviet period, and had been allowed to 
function under Gorbachev's liberal perestroika policy.)    Karimov's disproportionate 
apprehension for Islamic mobilization borders on the paranoid: according to Human 
Rights Watch, government harassment extends beyond outlawed Islamic organizations to 
independent citizens who simply display Islamic dress or other expressions of religious 
devotion. Punishments are severe and inhumane. 
State authorities punished independent Muslims with discriminatory 
arrest, incommunicado detention, torture, and prison sentences of up to 
twenty years for violations of strict laws on religion and alleged 'anti- 
constitutional' activity . . . Torture and ill-treatment in prisons was 
rampant, and there were several shocking reports of deaths in custody 
from torture in prisons.155 
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Islamic opposition groups in Uzbekistan have been forced underground or abroad; 
they are afforded no legitimate means of participating in political discourse. Given the 
state's excessive and violent oppression, the appearance of Islamic political violence is 
hardly surprising—nor is it a "foreign" phenomenon, as Karimov and other Central Asia 
leaders disingenuously claim. When IMU leader Tokhir Yuldashev claimed 
responsibility for a series of violent incursions with Uzbek authorities in August 2000, he 
demanded the release of an estimated 100,000 wrongfully jailed Muslim prisoners, and 
called for greater religious freedom in Uzbekistan.156 Hizb-ut-Tahrir claims that 50,000- 
100,000 Muslims are imprisoned in Uzbek concentration camps. Though these figures 
are unconfirmed, the Uzbek government acknowledges the existence of such camps, and 
fieldwork by the International Crisis Group (ICG) indicates that arrests have been 
occurring on a large scale. 
Uzbekistan's political climate since independence has been extremely conducive 
to violent opposition. After a brief embrace of Uzbekistan's "Islamic Renaissance" in 
1991, President Karimov has grown increasingly intolerant of all Islamic activity— 
political or otherwise. Militant resistance has grown in tandem with Karimov's 
oppressive policies. As Henry L. Clarke, former US Ambassador to Uzbekistan, warns, 
"Excessive crackdowns by law enforcement agencies serve no one: such tactics seem 
more likely to cause the politicization of Islam, and to push believers into extreme, illegal 
I CO 
actions, than to prevent them." 
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Though Uzbekistan's autocratic political environment and anti-Islamic policies 
are perhaps the most severe, both are generally consistent with those of the other Central 
Asian states. All five Central Asian republics are governed by strong executives that 
dominate the judicial and legislatives processes. All five governments are secular and 
respond to organized Islamic opposition with varying degrees of oppression. Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, which share the turbulent Ferghana Valley with Uzbekistan, have 
experienced both political gains and setbacks since 1991, but recently both have drifted 
toward Islam Karimov's autocratic stance. 
Kyrgyzstan's growing reputation as an "island of democracy" in a repressive 
region was shattered in 2000, when President Askar Akayev manipulated polls for 
parliament and the presidency, and placed heavy restrictions on free speech, press and 
association, minority rights, and religion.159 In light of growing economic problems, 
Akayev has felt compelled to clamp down on opposition groups and parties. His fear of 
militant Islamic opposition has spurred government military action in the Ferghana 
Valley along Kyrgyzstan's border with Uzbekistan.160 According to Human Rights 
Watch, Kyrgyzstan intensified its repression of Hizb-ut-Tahrir in 2000, arresting tens of 
the group's followers and sentencing them to prison on grounds of "inciting religious and 
racial hatred."161 
Tajikistan's post-independence politics have been characterized by civil war, 
political violence and state repression.   In June 1997, the authoritarian government of 
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President Emomali Rakhmanov signed a peace treaty with the secular and Islamic 
opposition groups of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). A key provision of the treaty 
involved the appointment of UTO representatives to 30 percent of senior government 
positions. Though progress has been made, this quota has not been met, and Tajikistan 
has yet to see presidential or parliamentary elections that could be classified as free and 
fair.    Parliamentary elections held in February 2000 were flagrantly fraudulent and 
1 fO 
marked a significant step backward for Tajikistan's political development. 
Constitutional guarantees of press freedom and association are largely ignored, and 
religious groups such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir are persecuted despite the limited inclusion of 
Islamic-oriented UTO members in the government.163 The Tajik government remains in 
a state of post-conflict transition, but progress to date does not point to significant 
democratization in the near future. 
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan have not experienced an appreciable rise in 
political or militant Islam over the past decade. Though Presidents Niyazov 
(Turkmenistan) and Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan) are no less autocratic than their 
counterparts in the other three Central Asian republics, they preside over societies that are 
comparatively more secular. This development is attributable to several historical, 
geographical, and demographic factors. First, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan exist on the 
periphery of Central Asia's Islamic center—the nomadic populations of the steppes were 
simply farther removed from the more religious, sedentary enclaves of Bukhara, 
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Samarkand, and Ferghana.    Second, their populations are smaller and more diffuse 
relative to their geographic size. Finally, ethnicity plays a significant role—especially in 
Kazakhstan, where Russian Slavs constitute at least half of the overall population.164 
Despite the scarcity of Islamist mobilization in their respective states, Niyazov and 
Nazarbayev  have  not  demonstrated  an  especially  greater tolerance  for  religious 
expression or popular participation in political processes.165 
In all five republics, authoritarian politics are accompanied by failing economic 
policies.   As discussed in the previous section, Soviet centralized planning created an 
economy in which Central Asians were dependent on the state for social welfare, and the 
state was dependent on Moscow for imports and transfers. 
By thousands of threads, from electricity grids to oil pipelines to telephone 
lines, the Central Asian republics were tied into Russia. Moscow was an 
economic and financial spider's web from which no [Central Asian] leader 
... could ever see himself disentangled.166 
When the Soviet "web" disintegrated, Central Asian leaders were forced to 
administer their new states and meet the expectations of their populations without 
subsidies from the central budget. The most obvious course of action was to seek foreign 
direct investment (FDI). international aid, and new trading partners.    This strategy, 
however, would require a firm commitment to liberalization, which the formerly 
communist regimes perceived as a threat to their rule.   Accordingly, all of the Central 
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Asian republics except Kyrgyzstan167 paid lip service to economic liberalization without 
seriously pursuing it. Since 1992, most Central Asian regimes have eschewed even the 
notion of liberalization, emphasizing instead the virtues of stability and gradual reform 
over liberal "shock therapy." According to President Niyazov of Turkmenistan, "We 
should determine the rhythm and pace of our reform ourselves on the basis of local 
conditions, not according to the demands of some sort of classic, democratic formulas or 
perceptions worked out in some prosperous Western country." 
Consequently, ten years after gaining independence, the Central Asian economies 
remain largely statist, stagnant, and underdeveloped. Basic economic and social 
indicators suggest that the autocratic regimes are failing to uphold their end of the social 
contract. Wages have not kept pace with inflation and population growth, particularly in 
the rural agricultural sectors. Literacy rates that were nearly universal under the Soviets 
are falling, again in rural areas, as schools close or receive inadequate state support. 
Basic social infrastructure, from hospitals to schools and universities, is increasingly 
strained.169 
Of the five republics, only Kyrgyzstan and—by a slim margin—Kazakhstan 
exhibit private sectors that account for majorities of their gross domestic product (GDP). 
Kyrgyzstan's private sector contributes 70 percent of its GDP, while the Kazakh private 
sector hovers at a more modest 55 percent. Private ownership as a percentage of GDP in 
the other three republics is as follows: Uzbekistan (45 percent), Tajikistan (30 percent), 
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and Turkmenistan (25 percent).170 Of these three, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain 
predominantly statist by choice, while Tajikistan's economic development has been set 
back substantially by its civil war.    In any case, the legitimacy of Central Asian 
privatization efforts is questionable. As Rashid observes, privatization has not generated 
a real modern, capitalist business elite.  Instead, the old party apparatchiks have simply 
become business rather than state managers. 
They run their enterprises as they did in the past except that their rhetoric 
has changed from one of socialism to one of the market economy. Most 
of them have refused to sell off their enterprises, while others do so only at 
the cost of ensuring large payoffs for themselves and their families. This 
grip on industry by the old bureaucracy remains unshaken. " 171 
Each of the Central Asian republics hopes to develop economically on its own 
terms based on its particular strengths and resources, but all are dependent on access to 
international markets and capital investment—both of which have proven somewhat 
elusive thus far. Given their broader resource and labor bases, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, 
and Turkmenistan have the greatest potential for viable economies, though this very 
potential also serves as a disincentive for liberalization. These three states possess 
considerable oil and gas reserves, and hope to base their economies on export revenues 
from these resources.172 In both Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, Niyazov and Karimov 
control the energy sector, and there are no plans to privatize any of it. Kazakhstan's 
government has sold some of its national oil company to private investors, but all three 
presidents are banking to some extent on energy rents to shore up their failing economic 
policies and secure the legitimacy of their rule.   The geopolitics of oil and gas are 
Karatnycky, Motyl, and Piano, pp. 326, 348, 616, 640, and 694. 
Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia, p. 70. 
172
 Anderson, p. 126. 
86 
discussed in the next section, but foreign investment in export routes remains the biggest 
obstacle to expanded development and exploitation of Central Asia's energy resources. 
The development outlook in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is more complex and even 
less certain. Unable to rely on a wealth of oil and gas reserves, these states are harder 
pressed to redevelop their economies. Both Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are highly 
dependent on Russia and their Central Asian neighbors for energy supplies, and both 
have found themselves in conflict situations resulting from their inability to pay for such 
resources on schedule. Two industrial sectors, hydroelectric power and mineral mining, 
offer the potential for some economic sufficiency. "As in other areas, however, problems 
stem from dependence on Russian markets and the need to modernize often primitive 
technologies and plants, all of which requires considerable capital investment." 
Instantly recognizing its dire need for foreign aid, Kyrgyzstan submitted to austerity 
measures mandated by the World Bank, IMF, and other lending agencies soon after 
attaining independence. As a result, Kyrgyzstan was admitted into the WTO in 1998. 
In recent years, however, its economic development has faltered along with its 
democratic reforms. In the wake of its civil war, Tajikistan has endeavored to meet 
macroeconomic stability commitments to the IMF, but "the transition to a market 
economy has been hampered by the civil war, geographic isolation, natural disasters, and 
a lack of political will . . . Privatization has proceeded slowly and has been plagued by 
corruption and insider dealing."175 
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The most pressing regional crisis, however, involves Central Asia's Ferghana 
Valley, an agricultural region that is also Central Asia's bastion of Islamic 
fundamentalism. Shared by Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, the Ferghana Valley 
is the most volatile manifestation of Central Asia's political and economic problems. 
Like other rural agricultural areas, it is wracked with greater poverty, illiteracy, and other 
socioeconomic problems. The Soviet legacy of cotton specialization and ecological 
damage exacerbates the problems of inefficient state planning and low capital investment. 
Most Ferghana inhabitants work on collective farms that are bankrupt and falling apart, 
and many live on whatever they can produce on the side, rather than the cotton that is 
supposed to be the mainstay.176 
Nancy Lubin and Bamett R. Rubin identify several repercussions of the Ferghana 
Valley's economic deprivation and decline, all of which contribute to the rise of Islamic 
mobilization in the region. First, the Ferghana provinces are stigmatized as "losers" 
relative to the other parts of their respective countries. This has resulted in expressions of 
resentment that the valley is excluded from economic decision-making and does not stand 
to benefit proportionately from government investment and foreign aid. Second, 
economic hardships have ignited tensions between ethnic groups as competition for 
increasingly scarce resources—land, water, jobs, etc.—intensifies throughout the valley. 
These problems are compounded by the effects of poor economic planning: high 
inflation, corruption, and wage payment arrears.177 
Coming on top of their inability to meet the socioeconomic needs of the Ferghana 
Valley, the governments' political oppression and aggressive persecution of Islam simply 
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add fuel to the fire of Islamist opposition. The majority of state crackdowns and cross- 
border skirmishes with opposition forces have taken place in and around the Ferghana 
Valley. "The government's tendency to overreact to security threats will continue to be 
one of the most important factors pushing devout Muslims towards Islamic 
fundamentalism and political violence. The failure of the government's economic 
policies and the resulting hardship will prove to be a fertile ground for Islamist 
dissent."178 
As the Ferghana Valley simmers, Central Asian leaders are thus faced with the 
task of mitigating popular discontent in order to limit the appeal of political Islam and 
preserve state security. This could be accomplished in one of two ways: improvement of 
economic conditions or alleviation of political oppression. The simultaneous 
implementation of both options would be ideal, but such a solution is beyond the political 
will or capability of any Central Asian government in the short term. Considering these 
options separately, political reform carries the greatest risk for the current regimes. 
Enhanced political participation, along with an easing of religious persecution, would 
probably function as an effective "pressure valve" for growing social unrest. It is just as 
likely, however, to weaken the regimes' power in the process—especially if political 
freedom comes without economic improvement. Additionally, given the secular states' 
anxieties about Islamist mobilization—particularly in Uzbekistan, where Karimov has 
instigated the most tension between Islamists and the state—Central Asian leaders are 
unlikely to ease religious oppression any time soon. 
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Economic development, by contrast, promises to reduce Islamist discontent while 
serving the interests of the Central Asian regimes. Flourishing economies alleviate 
popular frustration while shoring up regime legitimacy and strength. Strengthened 
Central Asian governments would then have a solid basis from which to initiate gradual 
political reform or reinvigorate the authoritarian welfare state. As many analysts observe, 
however, "the economic future of Central Asia indeed depends in no small measure on 
the successful development of regional energy resources, concentrated in the Caspian 
Basin." Since the development of the region's energy reserves depends entirely on 
FDI, it is useful now to examine the international politics of oil and gas pipelines in 
Central Asia. 
C. THE NEW GREAT GAME: GEOPOLITICS, PIPELINES, AND THE 
TALIBAN 
Alluding to the romanticized description of Great Britain's nineteenth century 
struggle with imperial Russia for empire in Central Asia, many journalists and academics 
have attempted to characterize contemporary politics in Central Asia as a new "Great 
Game."   For the past ten years, there indeed has been a great deal of international 
speculation about the extent of the region's latent mineral wealth, and major powers 
including Russia, the United States, Turkey, China, Pakistan, and Iran—not to mention 
countless private corporations and consortiums—have jockeyed for position in the race to 
harvest these resources.  The days of empire building are over, however, and by almost 
any measure, Central Asia's oil and gas reserves fall far short of the Persian Gulfs 
quantity and quality. Michael Collins Dunn is perhaps more accurate when he describes 
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the current scene in Central Asia as a mosaic of "many smaller games, rivalries and 
counter-rivalries, crisscrossing national and ethnic interests."180 Competition for pipeline 
contracts is one of many contests that include secularism versus Islam, India versus 
Pakistan, Shi'i Iran versus Sunni Pakistan and the Taliban, the United States and Turkey 
versus Russia and/or Iran, and various ethnic and national rivalries throughout the region. 
Amidst this myriad of games both great and small, the Central Asian 
governments—particularly Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—desperately 
hope to profit from their largely untapped resources in order to bolster their floundering 
economies and fledging independence. As the previous section observed, foreign capital 
investment is a prerequisite for economic development in Central Asia. Though the 
region's mineral resources may be comparatively modest, revenues from these resources 
could have enormous impact on the region's small and inert economies, providing the 
basis either for meaningful market reform or reinvigoration of the welfare state. 
Additionally, such improvement might then provide incentive for additional FDI in other 
Central Asian industries. The result, Central Asian regimes hope, would be enhanced 
popular legitimacy for their rule and reduced popular appeal for Islamic opposition 
groups. This section examines the prospects for the development of Central Asia's oil 
and gas reserves—prospects that hinge not only on the strategic competition between 
would-be foreign investors, but also on the rogue behaviors of the Taliban, which create 
substantial disincentives for FDI in the region. 
Estimates of Central Asia's oil and gas reserves have varied wildly over the past 
decade. The purpose here is not to explore in depth the region's various energy fields or 
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conduct a precise cost-benefit analysis, but rather to provide a general sense of the stakes 
involved for the Central Asian republics and other interested powers, and the ways in 
which the Taliban regime interferes with these interests. As estimates emerged in the 
early 1990s that were much greater than Soviet-era estimates, some touted the Caspian 
Basin as a "new Persian Gulf."181 Subsequent studies have dampened expectations 
somewhat. At best, the North Sea is perhaps a better comparison, though much more 
exploration needs to be done. As Tables 1 and 2 indicate, the largest oil reserves are in 
Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan hold the lion's share of natural gas 
reserves. Hilary McCutcheon and Richard Osbon analyzed 32 key development projects 
in the Caspian region and estimated that the cost of bringing 18 billion barrels of oil to 
market over the next 30 years would average about $10 per barrel. This estimate includes 
capital expenditures, operating expenses, and transportation.182 As Garnett, Rahr, and 
Watanabe observe, these relatively high cost estimates indicate that the world energy 
market outlook will be vital in determining the profitability of Caspian oil and gas 
development. The current oil market as of April 2001 has undoubtedly provided some 
measure of reassurance to investors concerned about development costs. 
Over time, Caspian gas is of greater commercial interest than oil.    Though 
Uzbekistan is a leader in gas potential, it is geographically farther removed from the hub 
"Caspian Basin" refers to the Caspian Sea itself as well as the geographical area surrounding it. This 
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1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Kazakhstan 516 409 716 1,390 1,684 2,186 2,531 
Azerbaijan 251 186 290 530 1,285 1,320 1,093 
Turkmenistan 114 97 146 239 307 304 251 
Uzbekistan 68 169 172 159 118 107 97 
Total 949 861        1,324       2,318        3,394        3,917       3,972 
Table 1. Oil Production Potential in the Caspian Basin (thousands of barrels per day). From Hilary 
McCutcheon and Richard Osbon, "Risk Management, Financing Availability: Keys to Winning in Caspian 
Region," Oil and Gas Journal 98:30 (24 July 2000) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 
Turkmenistan       8,491 2,960 4,286 6,190 8,515 10,839 12,732 
Uzbekistan            3,935 4,607 5,253 5,745 5,813 6,109 6,421 
Kazakhstan               643 434 1,009 1,917 3,457 5,039 5,729 
Azerbaijan 969 643 606 1,027 3,114 3,813 3,973 
Total 14,029 8,644 11,154 14,879 20,899 25,800 28,855 
Table 2. Gas Production Potential in the Caspian Basin (millions of cubic feet per day). From Hilary 
McCutcheon and Richard Osbon, "Risk Management, Financing Availability: Keys to Winning in Caspian 
Region," Oil and Gas Journal 98:30 (24 July 2000) 
of pipeline activity in the Caspian Basin (see Appendix) and could lose out to other gas 
producing states in the region. Given its comparatively low oil reserves and greater 
socioeconomic tensions, the stakes here are particularly high for Uzbekistan. According 
to McCutcheon and Osbon, Uzbekistan, despite its resources, is at risk of failing to meet 
even its own domestic energy needs. "Unless considerable efforts and investment are 
made in exploration in the near future, the country risks becoming a net oil importer 
again by 2005."   Without access to convenient markets, "Uzbek gas production will 
184 probably reflect internal demand rather than production capability." 
The key for the Central Asian side of the Caspian Basin, then, is access to 
convenient markets with high long-term energy demand. Such a market lies to the south 
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and east, from India and Pakistan to China, where energy analysts predict that demands 
for gas imports will outpace those of Europe within two decades.185 Asian markets offer 
the most direct and cost-effective export routes from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to 
South Asia and/or the Arabian Sea. These routes must traverse Afghanistan or Iran, 
however, and herein lies the rub. International politics and the Taliban's destabilizing 
"rogue" behavior have thus far prevented any development of pipelines through these 
southern routes. Longer routes through Russia, the Caspian Sea, and Turkey have been 
pursued instead, though comparatively high costs and complex logistics have delayed 
completion of these projects. 
Given its staunch political opposition to both the Taliban and the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, the United States has been a major spoiler of pipeline routes through Afghanistan 
or Iran. The most prominent example is the Unocal debacle, in which an American-led 
consortium was forced to abandon its plans for oil and gas pipelines across Afghanistan 
and Pakistan to ports on the Arabian Sea. In 1996, the American energy corporation 
Unocal entered into a series of agreements with Uzbekneftegaz, Uzbekistan's national oil 
company. In 1997, the Unocal project coalesced into a consortium called "CentGas," 
which included oil companies from Japan, South Korea, and Pakistan. Though 
Afghanistan's political situation was volatile, Unocal had taken great pains to develop a 
business relationship with the Taliban. After investing tens of millions of dollars in the 
pipeline project, Unocal began to receive pressure from domestic groups in the United 
States opposed to the Taliban's treatment of women and other human rights abuses. 
Unocal was forced to withdraw from the CentGas consortium after the United States 
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launched missile attacks on camps in Afghanistan linked to Saudi dissident Usama Bin 
Ladin in August 1998. Subsequent unilateral and bilateral sanctions against Afghanistan, 
along with the Taliban's ongoing civil war, have prevented any resumption of the 
project.186 
The collapse of the CentGas deal was particularly disappointing to Pakistan, 
which has supported the Taliban regime mainly in hopes of turning Afghanistan into a 
strategic bridge between Pakistani and Central Asian markets. Since the shortest 
distances between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean lie through their territory, the 
Pakistanis stand to be not only a pipeline outlet for oil and gas, but also a major port for 
Central Asian commerce in general.187 Iran, on the other hand, sees advantage in the 
blocking of pipelines through Afghanistan. While doggedly pursuing its own pipeline 
deals with Russia, Sweden, and other nations, Iran seeks to keep the Taliban as politically 
and economically isolated as possible. If trans-Afghan pipelines are exporting Iranian 
oil, however, the Islamic Republic has demonstrated a willingness to negotiate. Both Iran 
and Turkmenistan have pursued separate negotiations with Pakistan and India in hopes of 
keeping alive the prospects for trans-Afghan pipelines. 
On a more global scale, the United States, Russia, and China each seek to exploit 
Central Asian energy resources while preventing one another from gaining hegemonic 
influence in the region. In an effort to deter Russia, Iran, and the Taliban while 
simultaneously promoting Turkey's interests, the United States adamantly supports 
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construction of pipelines from Baku in Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on the Mediterranean coast 
of Turkey (see Appendix). Despite the Baku-Ceyhan project's enormous costs, the 
Clinton administration argued that it offers the most secure export route and obviates the 
need for increased tanker traffic through the Bosporus. Though the American 
government has (somewhat forcefully) held a consortium together, many investors and 
analysts question the project's commercial viability.189 Like the secular Central Asian 
governments, Russia and China are notoriously intolerant of Islamic dissent. Given the 
substantial borders that they share with Central Asia, both great powers are driven by 
security concerns as well as economic interests. Russia naturally favors pipeline routes 
that traverse Russian territory on their way to European markets, while China has 
considered the construction of massive pipelines from Kazakhstan directly to China. 
Though China is deeply concerned about meeting its future energy demand, the costs of 
such an undertaking are prohibitively high in the near term. 
While competition among a variety of outside powers with varying strategic 
interests has hindered Central Asia's ability to connect with South Asian markets, the 
greatest obstacle to this end clearly has been the Taliban and their destructive behavior in 
Afghanistan. Absent the ongoing civil war and atrocious human rights issues in 
Afghanistan, the CentGas project—and probably other ventures as well—would likely be 
completed and operational by now. Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan would 
already be receiving steady income for oil and gas exports to Pakistan, India, and other 
South and East Asian markets, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would at least have the 
benefit of new markets for their non-energy goods such as cotton and minerals. Though 
Islam Karimov is prone to exaggeration when discussing the "Islamic threat" from 
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Afghanistan, he is quite right to lament the Taliban's impact on the Central Asian 
economy: 
The war in Afghanistan ... is today the major constraint for new transport 
links which would allow the Central Asian states to have access to 'warm 
sea' ports and would help to integrate them into the existing system of 
world trade. This, consequently, holds back the development of national 
economies, because it is a well-known fact that the shortest and most 
stable transport links are necessary for an effective commodities 
exchange.190 
In addition to civil war and human rights abuses, Taliban activities such as 
narcotics distribution and support for militant Islamist groups also deter foreign 
investment and contribute to security problems in Central Asia.   In 1999, Afghanistan 
became the world's largest source of opium, single-handedly producing over three 
quarters of all the opium on the world market.191 As part of the opium-producing region 
known as the "Golden Crescent," Afghanistan has long been a source of illegal narcotics. 
Upon their rise to power in the mid-1990s, the Taliban initially turned a blind eye toward 
poppy farmers, who had no other income alternatives in Afghanistan's devastated 
economy.    As time went on, however, the Taliban increasingly used opium profits 
themselves to fund their civil war against the Northern Alliance. The Taliban expanded 
the areas available for poppy production and facilitated trade routes, pocketing at least 
1Q? $20 million a year in opium taxes and even more on the side. 
The Taliban's escalation of the narcotics trade has had devastating consequences 
for Central Asia's economy and security—particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, 
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which have become major export routes for Afghan opium. It is estimated that up to 65 
percent of Afghan opiates are exported via Central Asia. The growing drug trade 
exacerbates income disparities, distorts the formal economy, gives rise to corruption and 
organized crime, impedes the rule of law—especially when law enforcement officials are 
involved in the trade, and constitutes a health epidemic as more and more Central Asians 
become heroin users.193 In April 2001, Tajikistan's Deputy Interior Minister, who 
headed a government crackdown on organized crime, was assassinated by Tajik drug 
lords. This gangland-style killing highlighted the power of organized crime and the 
state's vulnerability to this growing problem. Worse yet, the troubled Ferghana Valley, 
where economic failure and Islamic fundamentalism cohabitate, is a major hub of the 
narcotics pipeline. The Taliban's drug trade thus pumps illicit funds into the heart of 
Central Asia's Islamic opposition.195 
In August 2000, the Taliban publicly outlawed poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, 
though it is impossible for international observers to confirm fully the validity of this 
claim. Many analysts speculate that the Taliban intend only to drive opium prices up and 
then reinstate production. In any case, enormous stockpiles from previous harvests 
remain in Afghanistan. Unless the Taliban destroy these as well, the impact of their 
alleged ban on cultivation would not impact the international narcotics trade for up to five 
196 years. 
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Finally, though the Taliban are not responsible for the rise of militant Islam in 
Central Asia, there is little question that the regime indeed provides shelter, supplies, 
arms, funds, and perhaps paramilitary training to the IMU and other militant Islamists 
throughout Central Asia and the Muslim world. Detailed information about the Taliban's 
support for international terrorism is not publicly available, but Afghanistan's numerous 
training facilities—many of which remain from the Soviet-Afghan War—are widely 
believed to host a variety of militant Muslims. Whether these groups are the guests of the 
Taliban or Usama Bin Ladin (or both) is unclear. Bin Ladin has publicly declared his 
financial support for the IMU, though the extent of the MJ's financial resources is 
unknown.197 According to recent reports, Bin Ladin helped IMU leader Juma Namangani 
purchase two helicopters, which are based in an IMU camp in Afghanistan. Additional 
funding comes from the drug trade, as the IMU participates in the cross-border smuggling 
of Afghan opium.198 Yuldashev and Namangani maintain offices in Kabul, and the 
Taliban has refused official Uzbek requests for the IMU leaders' extradition. The U.S. 
State Department accuses the Taliban and Bin Ladin of training and funding the IMU. 
Additionally, the Taliban regime permits the operation of training and 
indoctrination facilities for Islamic militants waging jihad in Chechnya, Kashmir, 
Tajikistan, Dagestan, and China's Xinjiang province, where Muslim Uighur separatists 
seek independence from Beijing.   In addition to the IMU, organizations such as Bin 
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Ladin's al-Qaida, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ), and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG) all 
find safe haven and some measure of support in Afghanistan.200 
The Taliban thus contribute to Central Asia's Islamic discontent in two ways: 
first, they exacerbate the region's failing political economy by deterring vital FDI in 
Central Asia's energy resources and by instigating a dangerous rise in criminal activities. 
Second, they provide safe haven and support to the militant Islamists that arise in 
response to Central Asia's failing political economy. These are serious problems; Central 
Asian leaders and interested world powers are entirely correct to be concerned about the 
Taliban's impact on the rise of Islamist violence in Central Asia. The Taliban are indeed 
a destabilizing force throughout the region, and they are directly involved with groups 
such as the JMU. 
It must be reemphasized, however, that Central Asia's Islamic opposition did not 
originate with the Taliban. There is no reason to assume substantial ideological 
conformity between the Taliban and Central Asian political Islam or fundamentalism. 
Militant Islam in Central Asia is a distinctly indigenous phenomenon, arising in response 
to indigenous political and economic conditions. To the extent that the Taliban regime 
contributes to these extant problems, it can be considered an intervening variable in 
Central Asia's Islamist problem, but little more than that. 
There is a paucity of substantive open-source information on the Taliban's support for the MJ and 
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One might inquire why this distinction matters. As long as the Taliban are a 
significant part of the problem, does it really make a difference whether they caused it or 
not? Shouldn't Central Asian leaders and world powers take action to stop the Taliban's 
destabilizing behavior? The answers to these questions are "yes" and "yes," but the 
appropriate policy responses differ in important ways depending on where we locate the 
crux of Central Asia's Islamist insurgency. Policy implications, along with general 
theoretical conclusions and summation of key findings, are the subjects of the next and 
final chapter of this study. 
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V. CONCLUSION: THE TALIBAN AND CENTRAL ASIA 
Under scrutiny, the Taliban are revealed to be little more than a violent aberration 
of Islamic culture, an anachronistic regime tenuously reigning over a chaotic, 
economically devastated nation. Their severe ideology, amorphous governmental 
structure, and general disregard for affairs of state (beyond enforcement of their 
obscurantist sharid) indicate that the Taliban are indeed a particularly dismal variant of 
Roy's "neofundamentalism." The Taliban, like the neofundamentalist model, appear to 
be "concerned solely with reestablishing Muslim law ... without inventing new political 
forms," meaning that they wallow unproductively in "traditional ethnic, tribal, or 
communal divisions."201 
Several factors distinguish the Taliban from the model of "failed Islamism," 
however, and these are worth exploring. First, unlike that of other neofundamentalists (or 
fundamentalists or Islamists), the Taliban's ideology is much less attributable to an 
ascetic or radical interpretation of Islamic sharia than it is to relatively secular factors. 
Given their underlying political and economic frustration, it must be granted that all 
Islamist opposition is grounded in both spiritual and temporal concerns. There are 
nonetheless common intellectual threads that link most Islamist or fundamentalist groups. 
The influence of seminal thinkers and movements such as al-Afghani, Qutb, Maududi, 
the Muslim Brotherhood, and Jama'at-i-Islami, is present throughout contemporary 
Islamist ideology. Though their sociopolitical contexts differ, most Islamist movements 
base their ideologies on common Islamic notions of justice, equality, jihad, etc. The 
Taliban are a notable exception to this trend.    The Taliban's obsession with blood 
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vengeance and pathological disdain for femininity contradict fundamental Islamic 
precepts, but are quite consistent with the Taliban's obscure tribal code—particularly 
when this code is unattenuated by education or other aspects of normal Afghan 
socialization. Their unusually violent and regressive behavior is also the product of a 
childhood disrupted by brutal warfare. Like Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, the Taliban are 
very much the children of war—culturally alienated, unsocialized, and desensitized to 
violence. Additionally, their time spent in the refugee camps was filled with a unique 
religious indoctrination that was simultaneously ultra-conservative and radical. In short, 
the differences between the Taliban on the one hand and all other Islamic movements on 
the other are greater than the differences among all other movements. If one were to 
schematize Islamic movements on an oversimplified continuum ranging from 
conservative fundamentalism to radical Islamism, the most accurate position for the 
Taliban might be outside this continuum in a category of their own. 
The idiosyncrasy of the Taliban and the Afghan context make it extremely 
unlikely that Taliban-style ideology would find a receptive audience beyond the borders 
of Afghanistan. Other Islamist ideologies with far more conventional allure than that of 
the Taliban have failed to transcend local borders. Iran's revolutionary Islamism was 
differentiated by its Shi'i context, Marxist subtext, and the Ayatollah Khomeini's 
idiosyncratic concept of theocratic government (yelayat-e-faqih). Palestinian Hamas 
employs a mixture of Islamism and socialism against the particular milieu of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, while Algerian movements such as the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)— 
and especially the ultra violent Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—are the products of 
Algeria's tortured nationalism and enduring colonial legacy.    If the appeal of these 
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Islamist movements is bound by local particularities, then the same is doubly true for the 
Taliban regime, which most other Islamist movements regard as backward and extreme. 
Second, despite their utter political and economic failure, the Taliban have not 
reverted to conventional authoritarian and/or socialist models. They have been no more 
successful than other Islamists or fundamentalists in delineating effective political and 
economic policies, but they have stubbornly resisted any pressure to address these 
fundamental aspects of government. True to their principles, the Taliban have remained 
single-mindedly focused on transforming Afghan social mores and cultural norms. This 
focus is maintained at a tragic cost to Afghanistan and its future, but the Taliban to date 
have betrayed no concern for the negative consequences of their policies. This fact 
marks a departure from the accepted model of political Islam in power. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran, for example, despite its theological basis, exhibits many conventional 
institutions of government, including a constitution, a parliament, and elections. Iran's 
concern for its economic progress and international standing are evident in its active 
foreign policy and aggressive efforts to attract FDI and trading partners. Iran is by no 
means a thriving capitalist democracy, but its conventional political institutions and 
economic policies are prime examples of Islamism's tendency to recede in the face of 
political and economic necessity. The result, as Roy observes, is an ostensibly "Islamic" 
government that actually differs very little in form or function from conventional models. 
The Taliban regime's drastic departure from Islamist norms and its eschewing of 
conventional government do not mean that the Taliban have succeeded where other 
Islamists or fundamentalists have failed. On the contrary, the Taliban have not 
transformed Afghanistan into an Islamic ideal capable of substituting effectively for 
105 
either socialist authoritarianism or capitalist democracy.202 Unwillingness (or inability) 
to govern does not constitute a viable alternative to conventional government. The 
Taliban's failures, however, are problematic in themselves. Failed states are desperate, 
unstable and destabilizing. Since the Taliban's brutal ideology is relatively uninformed 
by commonly accepted Islamic principles, it is therefore unconstrained by such 
principles. This frees the Taliban to pursue any and all means necessary to achieve their 
primary goals: conquering all remaining resistance and recasting Afghan society in the 
Taliban's image. All's fair in the Taliban jihad: the slaughter of fellow Muslims, 
narcotics and weapons smuggling, harboring of international fugitives, and meddling 
with insurgencies in neighboring countries. They have no frame of reference other than 
violence and abject misery. In the face of economic ruin and international isolation, the 
Taliban have very little to lose. 
Turning now to fundamentalism and political Islam in Central Asia, it is clear that 
Islamic opposition movements are indigenous phenomena arising in response to domestic 
economic and political concerns. Both Islamists and fundamentalists have antecedents in 
Central Asia's history, and both were present in their current forms before the Taliban 
rose to prominence in Afghanistan. At most, the Taliban have exacerbated the conditions 
favoring Islamic discontent, but they did not instigate Central Asia's Islamic violence. 
The national conditions that attended the Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan (popular 
trauma and fatigue resulting from 20 years of constant warfare, the lawless violence that 
filled that the power vacuum, and the failure of secular or Islamist Mujahidin parties to 
Of course, any measure of the Taliban's achievement depends upon one's criteria for success. The 
Taliban themselves, for example, probably do not measure their success in practical or material terms, and 
would likely disagree with a negative assessment of their performance. 
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solve these problems) are not the conditions of the Central Asian republics, which are all 
quite stable despite recent Islamist violence. On the whole, Central Asian society is 
probably too secular and stability-minded to accept any Islamist or fundamentalist 
agenda. If so, the Taliban's violent and ascetic neofundamentalism should be especially 
unappealing. To the extent that the MU is associated with the Taliban, its popular 
appeal may therefore be further limited. 
The rise of Islamic opposition in Central Asia generally follows the widely 
accepted political economy explanation for Islamist discontent, though it deviates in 
certain respects. Though economic and political frustration is the driving force behind 
groups such as the MU, these movements do not strictly fit the Islamist socioeconomic 
profile. Political Islam typically involves educated, middle class males who have moved 
to the city only to be disappointed by the lack of suitable employment opportunities. In 
urban mosques or on university campuses, Islamist groups are able to recruit from among 
growing masses of frustrated, recently urbanized Muslims. Their collective frustration is 
then directed against perceived political, social, and cultural corruption, and is expressed 
in politicized Islamic terms. Variations of this basic pattern can be found virtually 
anywhere that Islamist organizations operate—from Algeria to Saudi Arabia to Iran. In 
Central Asia, however. Islamic discontent is not urban, middle class, or predominantly 
educated. 
As Roy observes, the Central Asian republics did not experience a rural exodus in 
the latter twentieth century. Central Asian society remains predominantly rural. If 
anything, post-Soviet emigration of Russian Slavs contributed to a slight decline in urban 
populations.  Additionally, Central Asian societies all have experienced declining rather 
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than accelerating birth rates.203 One consequence of this demographic stability is a 
growing socioeconomic rift between industrial urban centers and failing agricultural 
sectors. In the latter, militant fundamentalism and Islamism have arisen from the 
economic desperation of the post-Soviet farm collectives. The Ferghana Valley is the 
most volatile example of Central Asia's rural Islamist phenomenon. Though Central 
Asian literacy is relatively high on the whole, literacy rates are falling in rural areas 
where people are historically less educated. Poverty is also rampant in the aftermath of 
the damaged ecology and failed collective system. Central Asia's Islamism, then, is 
rural, relatively uneducated, and lower class. 
This atypical Islamist profile suggests two possible consequences. Either political 
Islam has taken a new form that calls the conventional model into question, or political 
Islam in Central Asia is unlikely to develop into a viable social and political movement. 
While Central Asian Islamism indeed differs from the conventional profile, this is most 
likely an indication of Islamism's ideological poverty in the region. Absent an educated 
middle class cadre or strong urban networks, politicized Islamic movements probably 
have little chance of acquiring a broad base of popular support. This prognosis, however, 
depends heavily on two related variables. The first is the character and depth of Central 
Asia's popular Islamic renaissance, and the second is the future political and economic 
climate in the Central Asian republics. 
Through description and analysis of geographical, cultural, and institutional 
constraints on Islamic ideology and praxis in Central Asia, this study has attempted to 
provide an accurate measure of popular religiosity in the region. Some empirical data 
were brought to bear, but current studies of popular Islam in Central Asia are lacking. 
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Accordingly, it cannot be claimed here with a high degree of certainty that most Central 
Asians are categorically opposed to Islamic political movements. Most available 
indicators suggest that Central Asian Islamic culture is comparatively secular, moderate, 
and apolitical, but further empirical inquiry is needed in this area. Even if the average 
Central Asian prefers not to mix religion with politics, this could change if the economy 
does not improve and politics remain authoritarian and repressive. The despair and 
frustration of the countryside has not yet wracked the urban centers, where support is 
comparatively high for Karimov and the other Central Asian presidents. Economic 
and/or political reforms are urgently needed to stem the tide of Islamic discontent in 
Central Asia. As the next section demonstrates, both reforms may be necessary to 
alleviate socioeconomic tensions and reduce the appeal of political Islam. 
A. "DUTCH DISEASE" AND THE RENTIER STATE 
A central contention of this study is that Central Asia's economic progress 
depends in no small measure on the ability to efficiently and profitably exploit the 
region's oil and gas resources. The Taliban inhibit this process by deterring FDI in 
pipelines and disrupting the Central Asian economy with massive heroin trafficking and 
the resultant growth of organized crime. With incoming wealth from energy exports, the 
Central Asian republics—at least Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (where 
Islamist opposition is strongest)—could shore up their failing economies, mitigate 
economic frustration among the populace, and lay the groundwork for political reform. 
This outcome, however, is a best-case scenario. It depends on the willingness of the 
current regimes to use energy revenues wisely and with foresight. It also requires them to 
open willingly the authoritarian political processes that sustain their rule.    While 
109 
economic and political liberalization are the ideal consequences of energy wealth, two 
other outcomes are more probable.    These are the complicated problem of "Dutch 
disease" and the rentier state phenomenon. 
"Dutch disease" is the term used by economists to designate the stagnation in 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors that often occurs in developing nations with 
inflows of energy wealth.  As Fairbanks, Nelson, Starr, and Weisbrode observe, Dutch 
disease functions in two ways.   First, the sudden windfall of revenues creates higher 
inflation in the newly energy-rich state than in its trading partners.   This development 
increases the cost of imports with corresponding decreases in the local currency value of 
revenue from international trade. Second, increased government spending raises demand 
for both tradable and non-tradable goods (mainly services). 
But, while international competition may keep down the prices of tradable 
goods, it is less likely to hold down the prices of services, which become 
relatively more costly and more rewarding to those who provide them. 
Capital and labor move to the more dynamic service sector of the local 
economy, while agriculture and manufacturing stagnate. The energy-rich 
nation thus becomes less competitive internationally.204 
The Dutch disease effect has been particularly strong in the former Soviet Union, 
where trade has boomed while production stalled.    "These trends lead generally to 
massive  flight  to  the  cities  where  the  population  cannot be  adequately  fed  or 
controlled."205 As the previous section observed, Central Asia has averted thus far the 
problem of urban migration, which in turn fuels Islamist discontent.   Additionally, the 
region's current socioeconomic frustration is highest in agricultural sectors, which the 
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Dutch disease problem would only intensify. While energy wealth offers enormous 
development potential for at least three of the Central Asian republics, the cycle of hope 
and disappointment that usually follows revenue windfalls could exacerbate Islamic 
discontent if these issues are not managed properly. 
Another backlash associated with energy revenues is the theory of the 
distributive—or "rentier"—state. The rentier state phenomenon is most commonly 
associated with the oil producing states of the Persian Gulf and North Africa. It 
designates governments that receive most of their national income from external rents on 
a natural resource rather than from domestic taxation or capital-producing agencies of the 
domestic economy. (Dutch disease is partially subsumed into the rentier process, insofar 
as the benefits of the state's rent-producing enterprise are isolated from other sectors of 
the economy.) All revenues received from the export of the rent-producing resource 
remain in the hands of the state rather than being diffused among the population. As 
Palmer, Alghofaily, and Alnimir observe, the rentier state benefits from economic 
advantages not available to less prosperous developing nations. "In particular, the rentier 
state possesses the capital necessary to create (by purchase), over a few years, an 
economic infrastructure of roads, drainage networks, and telecommunications that might 
otherwise take generations to construct." 
In addition to providing the state with a steady inflow of economic leverage, 
external rents have far-reaching political effects as well. Rentier dictators are able to 
structure their social contract with the populace in such a way that satisfies social welfare 
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expectations without reducing the state's monopoly on political power. Traditional state- 
society relations, in which the state grants certain political rights and powers to society in 
exchange for the resources it extracts from society, are subverted. Both bargaining and 
coercion become less critical for the state as it essentially purchases its legitimacy by 
"bribing" the population into political acquiescence. 
The state is expected to provide a certain level of economic security, in 
exchange for which society grants state leaders considerable political 
autonomy. Indeed, if anything, the slogan of the American Revolution— 
"no taxation without representation"—is reversed: In a rentier state, state- 
society relations seem predicated on the principle of "no taxation, no 
representation."207 
As long as energy rents sustain the state's ability to maintain both its security 
apparatus and the welfare state, there is essentially no domestic pressure on the 
authoritarian state to open its political process to the population. The results of the rentier 
phenomenon can be observed in states such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Algeria. 
Some rentier or semi-rentier states, such as Iran and Jordan, have taken tentative steps 
toward political liberalization as oil rents increasingly fail to support the distributive 
economy. In most cases, however, the populace remains essentially submissive while 
non-oil sectors of the economy remain underdeveloped or distorted. 
How, then, might the rentier problem affect the political economies of the Central 
Asian republics? Given the varying estimates of the region's oil and gas reserves, along 
with the complex and slow-going efforts to harvest and export these resources, it is 
presently difficult to predict the amount of energy revenues that each state will receive. 
While Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are likely to accrue enough rents to implement and 
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sustain a rentier social contract with their citizenry, the outlook is less certain for 
Uzbekistan and doubtful for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. On the Arabian Peninsula, non- 
oil producing states such as Jordan were able to maintain rentier economies based on 
transfers from oil-rich states such as Saudi Arabia that had oil revenues to spare. Even if 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are able to subsist on energy rents alone, it is 
highly unlikely that they'd be able or willing to support the Kyrgyz and Tajik 
governments. In any case, there is little reason to assume that the Central Asian dictators 
would use energy rents as a pretext for political liberalization. Given their public 
statements and policy actions throughout their first decade of independent nationhood, it 
is more likely that the post-communist leaders would use rents to enhance their 
legitimacy, increase defense spending, and further consolidate their rule. Even if this 
process involves judicious liberalization and diversification of the Central Asian 
economy, it is unlikely to lead intentionally toward political liberalization. As Glenn 
Robinson and Shibley Telhami aptly observe: 
The preeminent lesson from state-building enterprises throughout the ex- 
colonial world in the past few decades is . . . 'how you start significantly 
determines how you finish.' That is, 'many well-meaning officials in 
emerging states rationalized early excesses as necessary, or emergency, 
compromises that would be corrected in the future, only to discover that 
these mistakes often become permanent features' of the new states, with 
their own bureaucratic defenders.208 
If Central Asia's past and present are indeed the best indicators of its political 
future, then the prospects for political liberalization are bleak with or without economic 
progress.   Though oil and gas rents will probably strengthen most of the status quo 
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regimes, the probable onset of Dutch disease and the possibility of rentier dictatorship are 
not likely to diminish Islamist agitation. As long as the current regimes remain in power, 
they are unlikely to implement meaningful political reform. Their continued oppression 
of Islamic opposition groups will exacerbate the insurgency problem, and energy rents 
will probably do little more than enhance their ability to do so. Economic progress is 
therefore a necessary but insufficient condition for the reduction of Islamic political 
violence. If further conflict between militant Islamists and the secular governments is to 
be avoided, international influence and pressure must be brought to bear. The next 
section concludes this study with policy suggestions for the United States and the Central 
Asian governments. 
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The following policy recommendations are predicated on two basic assumptions. 
The first is that political Islam in power is an undesirable outcome. Given Islamism's 
demonstrated failure to provide open, effective, constructive government in other parts of 
the Muslim world, this study assumes that an Islamist coup would be no less disastrous in 
Central Asia. Second, it is assumed—in light of Chapter IV and the previous section of 
this chapter—that economic and political reform are the best guarantors of Central Asia's 
long term stability and freedom from Islamist violence. Additionally, these 
recommendations are restricted to the problem of containing effectively both militant 
Islam in Central Asia and the Taliban's destabilizing behaviors. It is not the intent of this 
study to propose broad U.S. policy toward Afghanistan or Central Asia. 
Afghanistan and the Taliban present significant foreign policy challenges for the 
United States and the world.     Aside from containing international terrorism and 
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maintaining regional stability, the United States has no real interests in Afghanistan per 
se. The country is poor in resources, devastated in terms of economics and infrastructure, 
and the combination of multilateral sanctions and international "donor fatigue" has 
staunched the flow of humanitarian relief. If the United States government is concerned 
about the Taliban's impact on Islamist insurgency in Central Asia, it must rethink its 
myopic policy toward Afghanistan—policy that revolves exclusively and inflexibly 
around the Taliban's sheltering of Usama Bin Ladin and support for international 
terrorism. Current U.S. policy objectives are reflected in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1333, which: 
• Demands the Taliban comply with Resolution 1267 and cease providing 
training and support to international terrorists. 
• Insists the Taliban turn over indicted international terrorist Usama Bin 
Ladin so he can be brought to justice. 
• Directs the Taliban to close all terrorist training camps in Afghanistan 
within 30 days.209 
This study contends that the Taliban are best characterized as a failed regime 
tenuously presiding over an unstable—and regionally destabilizing—state.    Current 
international policy toward Afghanistan does not seriously address regional security 
issues. While the Taliban's continued harboring of Bin Ladin and other militant Islamists 
is politically frustrating and morally deplorable, the single-minded American obsession 
with this issue is more emotional than practical or strategic. Bin Ladin should not be the 
beginning and end point of American policy toward Afghanistan. The United States and 
the United Nations have chosen to pursue these narrow objectives through the imposition 
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of political and economic sanctions. As in most other cases where sanctions have been 
employed, the Afghan sanctions have failed completely to achieve policy objectives or 
alter the Taliban's behavior in any appreciable way. As previously argued, the Taliban 
are essentially unconstrained by either conventional Islamic precepts or concern for the 
material welfare of the Afghan people. There is no reason to expect sanctions to achieve 
anything but further isolation, suffering, and desperation in Afghanistan.210 
There are no easy answers to the foreign policy dilemma presented by 
Afghanistan. The U.S. government's narrowly defined objectives and increasingly shrill 
rhetoric have essentially painted policy makers into a corner. It would be difficult at this 
point to change tack without appearing to back down or appease the Taliban. In light of 
the current policy's empirical failure, however, some degree of policy broadening and 
constructive engagement is in order. Peaceful resolution of the Afghan civil war should 
be pursued at least as urgently as Bin Ladin's extradition. As long as it continues, the 
war is not only a security threat to the states on its borders, but it also drives narcotics and 
weapons smuggling throughout the region. According to Fairbanks and company, "There 
is also a diminishing likelihood that the major powers—including China, Iran, Pakistan, 
and Russia—will be able to accommodate one another's interests in this region so long as 
they continue to support opposing sides in the Afghan conflict."211 
The U.S. government should regularly test the Taliban's willingness to engage in 
dialogue.  Again, destabilizing behaviors such as narcotics and weapons smuggling are 
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largely features of economic desperation.  Analysts such as Ahmed Rashid and Tamara 
Makarenko have suggested economic incentives as a means of ending the Taliban's civil 
war and criminal behavior. Peace could perhaps begin with the promise of a substantial 
reconstruction package provided by international  governments,  organizations,  and 
charities, which would be bestowed after the Taliban and the Northern Alliance reach a 
ceasefire agreement. "Such a package would essentially represent a bribe to the warlords 
while acting as an incentive for the people of Afghanistan to pressure both parties to 
reach an agreement." 
Makarenko makes the case for a more limited incentive—the construction of oil 
and gas pipelines through Afghanistan. Acting as a transit country for pipelines might be 
more financially lucrative for the Taliban than heroin distribution.  Pipelines could also 
foster   healthier   relations   between   Afghanistan   and   its   neighbors   through   the 
establishment of economic interdependence. The economic and security benefits for the 
energy-producing states of Central Asia are obvious—Afghanistan has long been an ideal 
but unavailable export route.  Granted, any engagement-oriented policy would likely be 
rejected by the United States. As Makarenko argues, however: 
... the USA should realize that a more realistic attitude towards the 
region is required. Once peace is attained in Afghanistan, regardless of 
whether it is done through economic bargaining chips, the USA would 
quickly realize benefits of its own: relatively secure access to the region's 
energy sources and the ability to deal with terrorism more closely.21 
The United States and /or the United Nations could certainly use diplomatic 
pretexts to justify shifts in policy.  The Taliban's official banning of poppy cultivation, 
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for example, has been dismissed out of hand by the United States without regard for 
whether or not the claim might be true. If the Taliban have in fact halted poppy 
production, the American government or the United Nations might respond in kind with 
some sort of economic gesture. Further incentives, of course, would depend on the 
Taliban's response to this initial gesture. In any case, the United States and the United 
Nations must put their Afghan policies into wider perspective. Regional peace, stability 
and independence, containment of intra-regional conflicts, and prevention of inter- 
regional disputes constitute international strategic interests. Isolated acts of terrorism, 
however deplorable, do not. 
Turning now to Central Asia, the United States and other interested powers must 
also reevaluate their policies. Absent the galvanizing issue of Bin Ladin and international 
terrorism, however, there is more room in Central Asia for policy maneuvering. 
Currently, the United States is committed to supporting the secular Central Asian 
governments in their bid to quell domestic Islamist insurgencies. With regard to the 
Islamist problem, American objectives are to: 
• Strengthen cooperation between regional counterterrorism and 
security policymakers to enhance regional capabilities to counter 
terrorism 
• Forge a common diplomatic front toward the problem of 
international terrorism 
• Provide additional information on law enforcement techniques to 
enhance international investigation and prosecution of terrorists214 
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While competing for pipeline concessions, the United States and Russia have 
provided substantial military support to the Central Asian governments. The United 
States has increased military-to-military contact and assistance programs, while Russia 
maintains troops on Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan. While security and stability 
are of primary importance in the region, international powers must avoid strategies that 
seek these objectives through competition and unconditional military and political 
support for the current Central Asian governments. Such policies serve no state's long- 
term interests, and only exacerbate conflict between militant Islamists and the Central 
Asian regimes. 
The United States, in particular, needs to reassess and clarify its purposes in 
Central Asia. No one seriously argues that America has vital interests in the region. 
Most strategic assessments of Central Asia don't even categorize Caspian and Central 
Asian  energy resources  as  strategic  interests—let  alone  vital. At  most,  the 
maintenance of peace, stability, and independence, along with the prevention of regional 
disputes and containment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), are American 
strategic objectives, while the promotion of the region's modest energy markets is an 
important but lesser interest. The same cannot be said, however, for other interested 
powers such as Russia, China, Pakistan, and Iran, all of whom share geographic borders 
with Central Asia and certainly have greater stakes in the region than does the distant 
United States. The U.S. government's current policy of pursuing Caspian and Central 
Asian energy exports at enormous cost while aggressively seeking to deny these markets 
to Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan is out of sync with American objectives in the region. 
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This policy projects two inaccurate implications: 1) that the U.S. government considers 
the region's energy resources to be of vital or strategic importance, and 2) that the United 
States seeks hegemonic influence in the region. Both implications contradict actual 
American interests, which are the promotion of stability and the prevention of conflict— 
objectives that are best achieved through a cooperative effort to enhance regional 
security, develop energy markets, and promote meaningful political and economic 
reforms. The first two objectives have been pursued separately and competitively by 
various powers, though no single interested power is capable of guaranteeing them. The 
last objective, which this study contends has primary importance for the containment of 
Islamist discontent, has not been pursued at all. 
The United States must revise its assessment of the Islamist problem in Central 
Asia. Instead of perceiving the Central Asian governments as bastions of secular stability 
against the violent, "Talibanized" Islamic insurgency, American analysts and 
policymakers should understand that the current Central Asian regimes are, in many 
respects, brutal dictatorships that oppress human rights, deny popular participation in 
political processes, and stunt economic reform. As in pre-revolutionary Iran, the 
appearance of politicized Islam is symptomatic of these domestic conditions. Policies 
that bolster the secular regimes' security apparatuses without an equal emphasis on 
political and economic reforms are counterproductive. "The readiness demonstrated by 
governments such as that of the U.S. to provide security assistance has led some in 
Central Asian governments to conclude that their commitment to fight drugs and radical 
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Islam is more important for Western capitals than promoting a just and tolerant political 
system."216 
To counter this perception and effectively neutralize Islamist agitation, the United 
States should work cooperatively with the United Nations and/or other interested powers 
to link Central Asian security, stability, and independence to political reform. Security 
assistance should in fact be conditional, at least to some degree, on such reform. 
Foreign governments and international organizations must support 
unwaveringly and unequivocally the position that regional security can 
only be assured if religious freedom is guaranteed and the legitimate 
activities of groups and individuals are not suppressed. This is not just 
because human rights are important in themselves, but because their 
suppression inevitably leads to militant responses. Central Asia can be 
compared with pre-Revolutionary Iran, where foreign support for an 
unpopular leader fostered worse leadership and antagonism toward both 
the leader and the external supporter. 
Regardless of specific policy choices, the United States and other interested 
powers must reassess  and reconceptualize their broad objectives  and policies in 
Afghanistan and Central Asia. International policy should work in concert toward peace 
and stability in the region.   Its focus should be shifted away from exclusive obsession 
with the Taliban's idiosyncratic fundamentalism, which admittedly has problematic 
aspects (not the least of which is support for international terrorism), but certainly doesn't 
amount to a strategic threat to be "contained" like Soviet communism.   Afghanistan 
should instead be treated as a dangerously unstable and destabilizing state, while the 
Central Asian governments should be viewed as dictatorial regimes that, much like the 
Shah of Iran before them, are causing a growing Islamic backlash in their respective 
nations. Development of energy markets is an important part of economic reform, but 
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without simultaneous or subsequent political reform, economic progress might lead 
simply to other undesirable outcomes such as "Dutch disease" or rentier dictatorship. In 
the case of Central Asia, liberal values such democratization, human rights, and religious 
freedom are more than altruistic precepts; they are guarantors of security, stability, and 
progress. 
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APPENDIX. OIL AND GAS EXPORT ROUTES FROM THE CASPIAN BASIN 
From National Geographic Society, 1999, reprinted in Sherman W. Garnett, Alexander 
Rahr, and Koji Watanabe, The New Central Asia: In Search of Stability (New York: The 
Trilateral Commission, 2000). 
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